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Problem discussion: The Chinese market is gaining importance for Scandinavian 
engineering industries and is by many considered a crucial 
market to be successful in. These companies have a tradition of 
producing premium products for premium customers. 
However, in China many are currently experiencing the threat 
from local competitors producing products of somewhat less 
quality aimed at the vast Chinese middle market - the good-
enough market. Entering this market mean a first time venture 
into a lower quality segment for the Scandinavian companies. 
Hence the questions of if the good-enough market should be 
entered or not and what trends that can be distinguished. 
 
Purpose: The purpose with this thesis is to examine how Scandinavian 
engineering industries producing premium products for 
premium customers, enter local middle markets in China. 
 
Methodology: The research consisted of a benchmarking study where 
Scandinavian engineering industries in China were studied in 
order to distinguish an eventual pattern and trends. 
Distinguished trends were finally analysed according to the 
Uppsala internationalisation model and the theory of good-
enough markets. 
 
Conclusions: It is possible to merge segmentation theories with the Uppsala 
internationalisation model; it acts as a complement in order to 
better understand the mechanisms in the initial phases. The 
decision-making process remains incremental during the entire 
establishment chain where R&D is a natural continuation. The 
same internalisation model can also be distinguished during 
further establishment of an existing market, as in the case of 
the good-enough market. Companies that acknowledge this 
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market tend to also see the threat aspect of it. Hence the trend 
of acquiring a good-enough company and get rid of a potential 
threat. 
 
Key words: Uppsala internationalisation model, industrial behaviour, 
market segmentation, good-enough market, growth strategy 
 
Recommended reading for the hurried executive:  
If one is only interest in the core contents, the thesis authors 
recommend a quicker reading version of the thesis and hence 
the following chapters to be read: 
• Chapter 1 – Introduction (p. 1-6) 
• Chapter 3.4 – The good-enough market (p. 21-25) 
• Chapter 4 – Empirical findings (p. 29-52) 
• Chapter 5.2 – Entering the good-enough market or not (p. 
57-61) 
• Chapter 6 – Conclusions (p. 66-68) 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 v 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This thesis would not have been possible if not for the help and time of so many 
people from so many different companies and institutions. We had a wonderful time 
conducting the benchmarking study and writing the thesis. This is truly the most 
interesting and fun master thesis project ever to be apart of. The ambition was for this 
thesis to be of use for all the participating companies, not only for our partner 
company Alfa Laval, we hope that none of the companies will be disappointed.  
 
First of all, we would like to thank Alfa Laval and especially our supervisor Björn 
Wilhelmsson, R&D manager, for providing us this interesting topic and giving us the 
opportunity to experience Shanghai and the dynamic Chinese environment from its 
most compelling side. We really appreciate the freedom, encouragement and attention 
Björn gave us. We would also like to address additional thanks to all other Alfa Laval 
employees who have helped us, both in Lund and in Shanghai. 
  
This study relies heavily on the interviews conducted and the essence of this thesis 
lays in the hours our interviewees’ put into this thesis. We are honoured by the 
attention and interest this topic was received with among the benchmarking 
companies and we are grateful for time and effort laid down by the companies to 
support us. We want to express our deepest respects and thanks to each representative 
from ABB Robotics, ASSA ABLOY, Danfoss, Dynapac, Holip, Höganäs, Sandvik, 
SKF, Tetra Pak and one more company that has chosen to remain anonymous. We 
would also like to thank the Swedish Trade Council and the Swedish General 
Consulate in Shanghai as well as the nice and kind professors at Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University for taking their time to give us valuable inputs and wise guidance in for 
our work. 
 
Finally, we would like to thank our supervisors at Lund University, Martin Blom 
from the Department of Business Administration and Bertil Nilsson from the 
Department of Industrial Management. They have been of tremendous help for us 
during this process. 
 
 
 
 
Lund, 2008-05-23 
 
 
 
 
Yixin Fang   Per Wiklund 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 vi 
 
Table of contents 
 
1? INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 1?
1.1? CHINA AND THE SHANGHAI REGION .............................................................................. 1?
1.2? SWEDISH COMPANIES IN CHINA..................................................................................... 2?
1.2.1? Market position ..................................................................................................... 2?
1.3? PRESENTATION OF ALFA LAVAL ................................................................................... 4?
1.3.1? China establishment .............................................................................................. 4?
1.4? PROBLEM DISCUSSION ................................................................................................... 5?
1.5? PURPOSE........................................................................................................................ 6?
1.6? DELIMITATIONS............................................................................................................. 7?
1.7? TARGET GROUP ............................................................................................................. 7?
2? METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 8?
2.1? SEQUENCE OF WORK...................................................................................................... 8?
2.2? METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH...................................................................................... 9?
2.2.1? Deductive method................................................................................................ 10?
2.2.2? Positivistic paradigm .......................................................................................... 10?
2.3? EMPIRICAL DATA COLLECTION.................................................................................... 11?
2.3.1? Benchmarking study ............................................................................................ 11?
2.3.1.1? Benchmarking wheel................................................................................................... 12?
2.3.1.2? Benchmarking interviews ........................................................................................... 14?
2.3.2? Secondary data.................................................................................................... 15?
2.4? METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ............................................................................... 15?
3? THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................. 17?
3.1? UPPSALA INTERNATIONALISATION MODEL – THE UPPSALA SCHOOL........................... 17?
3.1.1? Establishment chain ............................................................................................ 17?
3.1.2? The four mechanisms for the internationalisation process ................................. 18?
3.2? THE INDUSTRIAL NETWORK APPROACH....................................................................... 20?
3.3? COMPARING INTERNATIONALISATION THEORIES......................................................... 21?
3.4? THE GOOD-ENOUGH MARKET ...................................................................................... 22?
3.4.1? Market segmentation ........................................................................................... 22?
3.4.2? Strategies of entering the good-enough market .................................................. 24?
3.4.2.1? Entering from above.................................................................................................... 25?
3.4.2.2? Entering through mergers & acquisitions ................................................................... 26?
3.4.2.3? Burrow up from below................................................................................................ 26?
3.5? THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY................................................................. 28?
4? EMPIRICAL FINDINGS................................................................................................ 30?
4.1? PRESENTATION OF THE BENCHMARKING COMPANIES AND THEIR CHINA 
ESTABLISHMENT.................................................................................................................... 30?
4.1.1? ABB Robotics ...................................................................................................... 30?
4.1.2? Alfa Laval ............................................................................................................ 30?
4.1.3? ASSA ABLOY....................................................................................................... 31?
4.1.4? Danfoss................................................................................................................ 32?
4.1.5? Dynapac .............................................................................................................. 32?
4.1.6? Höganäs .............................................................................................................. 33?
4.1.7? Sandvik ................................................................................................................ 34?
4.1.8? SKF...................................................................................................................... 35?
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 vii
4.1.9? Tetra Pak ............................................................................................................. 35?
4.2? CHINESE MARKET, TODAY AND TOMORROW ............................................................... 36?
4.2.1? ABB Robotics ...................................................................................................... 37?
4.2.2? Alfa Laval ............................................................................................................ 37?
4.2.3? ASSA ABLOY....................................................................................................... 39?
4.2.4? Danfoss................................................................................................................ 40?
4.2.5? Dynapac .............................................................................................................. 42?
4.2.6? Höganäs .............................................................................................................. 43?
4.2.7? Sandvik ................................................................................................................ 44?
4.2.8? SKF...................................................................................................................... 45?
4.2.9? Tetra Pak ............................................................................................................. 46?
4.3? R&D IN CHINA............................................................................................................ 47?
4.3.1? ABB Robotics ...................................................................................................... 47?
4.3.2? Alfa Laval ............................................................................................................ 47?
4.3.3? ASSA ABLOY....................................................................................................... 47?
4.3.4? Danfoss................................................................................................................ 48?
4.3.5? Dynapac .............................................................................................................. 49?
4.3.6? Höganäs .............................................................................................................. 49?
4.3.7? Sandvik ................................................................................................................ 49?
4.3.8? SKF...................................................................................................................... 49?
4.3.9? Tetra Pak ............................................................................................................. 50?
4.4? OBSERVED DIFFICULTIES AND OTHER ISSUES .............................................................. 50?
4.4.1? Alfa Laval ............................................................................................................ 50?
4.4.2? Danfoss................................................................................................................ 51?
4.4.3? Dynapac .............................................................................................................. 51?
4.4.4? Höganäs .............................................................................................................. 52?
4.4.5? SKF...................................................................................................................... 52?
4.4.6? Tetra Pak ............................................................................................................. 52?
5? ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................... 54?
5.1? THE UPPSALA MODEL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CHAIN - TESTED IN CHINA .............. 54?
5.1.1? Developing R&D in China .................................................................................. 56?
5.2? ENTERING THE GOOD-ENOUGH MARKET OR NOT......................................................... 58?
5.3? MERGING THE GOOD-ENOUGH MARKET THEORY WITH THE UPPSALA MODEL............. 62?
5.3.1? State of market commitment ................................................................................ 63?
5.3.2? State of market knowledge .................................................................................. 64?
5.3.3? Commitment decision of change ......................................................................... 65?
6? CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 67?
6.1? SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ...................................................................... 68?
7? REFERENCES................................................................................................................. 70?
7.1? PUBLISHED .................................................................................................................. 70?
7.2? REPORTS...................................................................................................................... 72?
7.3? ELECTRONIC SOURCES................................................................................................. 73?
7.4? INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................ 74?
APPENDIX.............................................................................................................................. 77?
AGENDA................................................................................................................................ 77?
QUESTIONNAIRE.................................................................................................................... 78?
 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 1 
 
1 Introduction 
With the Olympic Games, the Tibetan riots and the ever increasing presence of 
multinational companies, China is for good and for worse, indisputably the country 
and topic of the year 2008. This thesis deals with the increasing middle market of 
China and how Scandinavian engineering industries can enter it. By starting with the 
local conditions and a presentation of the thesis submitter Alfa Laval, this chapter 
further introduces the problem discussion and the purpose of this master thesis. 
 
1.1 China and the Shanghai region 
China is a huge country, not only in population – 1.322 billions at the latest 
population count (Swedish Embassy, 2008), but with its 9.6 million km2, it is also the 
third largest country size wise in the world (Nationalencyklopedien, 2008a). Over the 
past five millennia this oldest known civilisation has been naturally isolated from the 
outside world by vast oceans to the South, jungles to the South, the world’s highest 
mountains to the West, and endless freezing steppes to the North. The Chinese empire 
has however prospered within these natural barriers and over time the Chinese 
inhabited and influenced their Asian neighbours both culturally and morally (Lewis, 
2000). 
 
Deng Xiao Ping was the first Chinese leader to seriously open China up for foreigners 
after the death of Mao Ze Dong in 1976. He gained power after a period of power 
struggles and launched the idea of “Socialism market economy”. This meant a series 
of reforms to steer China towards a communist version of an open market economy, 
with private ownership but under rigid state control (Nationalencyklopedien, 2008b). 
Since then the annual economic growth have been 9% on average. The World Bank 
estimated in 2004 that roughly 400 million people have been lifted out of extreme 
poverty as a result of the economic growth (Schwaag & Widman, 2005). 
 
Today China is the world’s third largest economy after the US and Japan, and is 
growing far more rapidly than the countries mentioned. By 2025, the Chinese 
economy is expected to surpass the American (Hawksworth & Cookson, 2008). With 
the newly gained wealth, the Chinese middle class has grown as well and many 
companies are eyeing the potentially largest market possible in world.  
 
The economic reforms started with a number of experiment areas in so called 
“economic free trade zones”, all located within costal areas and much of the growth 
today remains there. With most of its wealth concentrated along the costal areas, 
Shanghai – located in the Yangtze River Delta Region (YRD), is more or less the 
main engine behind the booming Chinese economy. The region only has about 10% 
of the country’s population, 2,2% of the land areal, but is responsible for 38,5 % of 
the entire Chinese exports in 2005 and receives about 41% of all the foreign direct 
investments (FDI) in China (Swedish Trade Council, 2006). The GDP growth in 
Shanghai have been 2-digit for the last 15 years and with over 6 millions immigrant 
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workers (Andreasson, 2007) there is plenty of labour available to fulfil all the needs 
of this new wealth. Worth to mention is, among many things, the maglev train, the 
deep-water harbour with its 32 kilometres sea bridge and the Pudong International 
airport.  
 
A majority of the 500 largest multinational companies (MNC) have chosen to 
establish themselves in the YDR region and in Shanghai in particular, the same goes 
for Swedish MNCs. 60% of the Swedish exports to China and 61% of the Swedish 
investments are located in this region. Here the companies are close to their 
customers, have access to suppliers, good infrastructure and become an attraction for 
potential highly qualified workforce (Swedish Trade Council, 2006). 
 
1.2 Swedish companies in China 
The Swedish industry is generally good at entering and establishing themselves in 
new markets at an early stage – the domestic market in a small country as Sweden 
does not offer much of expansion possibilities (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). According 
to Swedish General Consul Lars Andreasson, many of the traditional large Swedish 
companies had sales offices in China prior to the communist take-over. They all 
moved out before or during the Cultural Revolution between 1966-1976. It is 
therefore not surprising that many Swedish companies were amongst the first ones to 
re-enter the newly opened Chinese market during the 80s. Since then, many of the 
companies have enjoyed first-mover advantages, building strong brands based on 
quality and reliability. 
 
It all started in the middle of the 80s with Ericsson being the first Swedish company 
to re-establish in China, soon after Pharmacia followed with the creation of the Sino-
Swedish Pharmaceutical Corporation, both in the YRD-region. Many large Swedish 
manufacturing MNCs followed, starting representative offices in the YRD-region or 
in the Beijing area as complements to what they already had in Hong Kong and/or 
Taiwan. During the 90s the production followed and those representative offices 
gradually became investment companies that were allowed to own factories and sales 
companies. By the turn of the millennia, most of the supplying companies followed – 
almost like a flock. Around 2004 all kinds of Swedish lifestyle companies started to 
queue to get into the Chinese market, probably attracted by the emerging 
consumption orientated Chinese middle class. With these smaller companies came the 
Swedish banks and lawyers, but also the Swedish universities. The Swedish General 
Consul describes it almost like a ketchup bottle effect. 
 
1.2.1 Market position  
The Swedish manufacturing companies generally enjoy a high esteem in the industry. 
The Swedes are considered by the Chinese to be honest, polite, quality-focused and to 
always deliver on time (Jin, 2008).  
 
Generally the Swedish industrial products are too expensive for small domestic 
companies. The typical customers are other large MNCs’ subsidiaries in China. These 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 3 
companies themselves are manufacturing high quality products for a premium market 
both in China and globally. 
 
However the market environment in China today is quite unique and small or medium 
Chinese companies are growing at unbelievable rates. Chinese companies, favoured 
by having substantially lower prices and experience of being OEM1-supplier since 
many years, are today often capable of manufacturing top-quality products. They start 
off using or copying foreign technology and after gaining experience as OEM 
manufacturer or as copycats, they start developing technologies and best practices of 
their own with often very good results (Gao, Woetzel & Wu, 2003). These companies 
can be competitors as well as suppliers or customers to the Swedish companies.  
 
In many cases, large Swedish MNCs – in fact most of the international MNCs, tend to 
ignore these companies as they are often too small to be key customers or 
competitors. However in the last couple of years, according to Alfa Laval Vice 
President Steven Zhou, many of these companies have grown in size, in capacity and 
in quality; making them factors to be considered, not only in the Chinese market but 
also in the global market. A good example is Huawei Technologies that has managed 
to pass the obstacles of moving upwards in the markets, and are today considered a 
multinational player, in only 14 years. First, they focused on China’s developing areas 
and got established there. MNCs were scarcely present here since they did not have 
any incentives to compete on these markets. Secondly, through using the Chinese 
good-enough market as a catalyst, they approached other developing countries, such 
as Russia and Brazil, and are now competing on developed markets against other 
global competitors, and are doing this quite aggressively through its sales and 
marketing channels. From the beginning, Huawei have invested 10% of their sales 
into R&D activities. Through having low-cost R&D they have managed to quickly 
and fairly inexpensively release new products to penetrate the markets with (Gadiesh, 
Leung & Vestring, 2007). 
 
Alfa Laval Regional Product Manager Alif Saleh claims that Swedish companies face 
the potential of losing future important customers because these customers are today 
price sensitive rather than quality focused. They require products that are good 
enough. Good enough means that the products do not need to be operable in extreme 
situations, it should not last longer than the end user need it, it should have good 
trade-off between cost and quality and lastly, the customer wants products without 
frills. 
 
Associate professor Guoxiang Huang at Shanghai Jiao Tong University believes that 
Chinese market requirements will spread with time, first to other emerging markets 
where they might even be considered premium requirements, and later also to more 
developed countries. 
 
                                                      
1 OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) – the original manufacturer of a component for a 
product, which may be resold by another company 
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1.3 Presentation of Alfa Laval 
This master thesis has been written in collaboration with the R&D organisation of 
Alfa Laval’s Product Centre for Compact Heat Exchangers (CHE). Gustaf de Laval 
and Oscar Lamm founded Alfa Laval in 1883 under the name of AB Separator. 
Gustaf De Laval invented the first continuous separator that separated skimmed milk 
from cream. In 1938, the company started to make heat exchangers and moved the 
development and production to Lund. 1963 the name was changed to today’s Alfa 
Laval. In 1991 Tetra Pak Group acquired Alfa Laval. The headquarters were moved 
from Stockholm to Lund and were an independent industrial group within Tetra Pak 
Group. In 2002 the company was reintroduced to the Stockholm Stock Exchange and 
today the company provides equipment, systems and services for process optimisation 
based around three key technologies: centrifugal separation, heat transfer, and fluid 
handling. Their broad product range includes high-speed centrifuges, decanters, 
filters, desalinations plants and heat exchangers, and the company is operating in 
more than 100 countries (Alfa Laval, 2008). 
 
Alfa Laval has today set a goal to grow at an average of 5% annually over a business 
cycle. The growth is to be accompanied with favourable profitability. One of the key 
factors to help the company achieve these targets is its broad geographic coverage and 
strong local presence. Today, 30% of Alfa Laval’s sales originate from Asia (Alfa 
Laval Annual Report 2007). 
 
1.3.1 China establishment 
Alfa Laval has sold separators to China through its centralised division since the 50s. 
In 1984 Alfa Laval placed a representative office in Beijing and the sales were 
managed through Alfa Laval’s Hong Kong subsidiary (Anderson, 2008). Alfa Laval 
Manager Rolf Håkansson who worked towards the Chinese market during the early 
90s says that Alfa Laval were looking for a partnership in China in order to further 
establish their presence at this time. In 1994 Alfa Laval formed a joint venture with a 
Chinese heat exchanger producer in Jiangyin, which was fully owned by 1997, and 
the Chinese sales management moved from Hong Kong to the production facilities. 
They also tried a joint venture with another company with the purpose of producing 
separators, although this endeavour failed. In 1995 they formed another joint venture 
in Jiangsu that produced fluid equipment. This is today also fully owned. 
 
Today, Alfa Laval’s Chinese headquarters including sales are located in Shanghai and 
they have two production sites in the country. China, represent 12% of all orders, is 
Alfa Laval’s second largest market after the US. The growth is also larger in China 
than in the US (Alfa Laval Annual Report 2007). In spite of this, Alfa Laval’s sales of 
commodity CHEs in China are not nearly as successful as they are globally. Alfa 
Laval has like most other Scandinavian industrial engineering companies a long 
history of serving premium customers with premium products of high quality. The 
situation in China today is evidently not fitted for Alfa Laval’s current business 
model. The by far largest, volume wise, market for CHEs in China is the middle 
market. This is often referred to as the good-enough market and Alfa Laval’s 
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perception is that it is increasing at the expense of both the premium and low-end 
CHE markets. It is suggested that Alfa Laval should enter the good-enough market. 
The options are basically to either develop good-enough products themselves or 
acquire an existing Chinese good-enough competitor, or to do both; yet still keep their 
strong presence on the premium market (Saleh, 2008). However, the core question 
remains – how should this be managed? 
 
1.4 Problem discussion 
For Alfa Laval and many other Scandinavian industrial engineering companies, the 
Chinese market is representing more and more shares in overall turnovers. The 
Chinese market is considered a crucial market to be successful in. Alfa Laval is a 
perfect company to illustrate the problem. The company enjoys a premium brand and 
operates in a relatively stable premium market. It has had many years of reasonable 
market share growth in China but not as fast as the market. If Alfa Laval chooses to 
enter the good-enough market, it will be an issue of a first time venture into a 
completely new quality-segment in a single but dominant market. Much of the 
internationalisation theories deal with establishments in completely new geographical 
markets, the case of Alfa Laval is about a further establishment into a new segment in 
an existing foreign market.  
 
The thesis authors have noticed that many internationalisation theories are dominated 
with quite simplistic approaches. We have studied three other internationalisation 
theories: the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1988), the business strategy approach 
(Turnball & Paliwoda, 1986) and born globals  (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; Oviatt & 
McDougall, 2005).  
 
The eclectic paradigm and transaction cost analysis are more focused on the 
mechanisms behind the international entry modes of production rather than 
international establishment in general. The focus is on comparing the costs of control 
with the costs of vertical integration. The conclusion is that the pattern of 
international production relies on three sets of advantages in the multinational 
company: the competitive advantage, market internationalisation advantage and 
location specific advantages (Dunning, 1988). 
 
The idea behind the business strategy approach is quite pragmatic and represents a 
holistic and ad-hoc view of a variety of different findings on internationalisation. A 
MNC must always make trade-offs when deciding the methods of 
internationalisation. The basic assumptions are that a foreign expansion is a way to 
reduce the risk associated with only having a single market and that is a result of 
choosing amongst many available expansion strategies (Turnball & Paliwoda, 1986). 
 
Born globals is a more recent theoretical addition. The theory states that new 
companies today are international right from their birth. These companies do not take 
incremental steps for exports but are export focused right from the start (Knight & 
Cavusgil, 1996). The global market is the domestic market (Oviatt & McDougall, 
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2005). However, the theory tends to focus on new start-ups, often in high-tech 
industries.  
 
We see that the focus is often simplistic; it is on costs (the eclectic paradigm), on 
competition leverages (born globals) or just simply saying that it is all about trade-
offs (the business strategy approach). Few of these theories actually try to combine 
these different factors with each other. The Uppsala internationalisation model is 
perhaps one of few theories that do so. This model assumes the internationalisation 
process as a series of small incremental steps in which each decision is based on 
gained experience and the need of reducing uncertainty. Though many researchers 
(Reid, 1983; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Morgan & Katsikeas, 1997) have been 
interested in the Uppsala model, few attempts have been made to develop the model. 
People have preferred to create completely new theories instead of continuing to do 
what the original authors Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne did – to mix existing 
theories in different disciplines. The authors off this thesis would like to combine and 
try the model on a Chinese context and mixing it with ideas of market segmentation 
and expansions in an international market. 
 
If Alfa Laval chooses to go through with entering the good-enough market, Alfa 
Laval faces various options that need to be cautiously analysed. We have found that 
much of traditional marketing literature and theory discusses moving up towards 
premium segments and not downwards. With the issue of China and other developing 
countries’ good-enough markets, the thesis authors identify the need of studying this 
reverse behaviour. 
 
The ambition with this thesis is to create a simple and comprehensive overview on the 
industrial behaviour concerning Scandinavian engineering industries in the Chinese 
good-enough market. 
 
• Do the companies consider the good-enough market a threat or an 
opportunity? 
• Are there any apparent trends when it comes to acting upon this segment? 
• What presumptions are related with which actions? 
 
1.5 Purpose 
The purpose with this thesis is to examine how Scandinavian engineering industries 
producing premium products for premium customers, enter local middle markets in 
China. By doing this, the thesis authors intend to study if the Uppsala 
internationalisation model can be combined with market segmentation theories to 
explain the establishment behaviour and verify the applicability of this theoretical 
merger for Scandinavian MNCs in the Chinese good-enough market. 
 
Additionally, the results of this thesis shall be of benefit for all the participating 
companies in the benchmarking study, for Alfa Laval in particular, when 
manoeuvring in the shifting market of China. 
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1.6 Delimitations 
The data collection is gathered through a benchmarking study and only covers the 
cases of the participating companies. This limits the results, and the conclusions are 
hereby based upon these cases and cannot represent an explicit reality. There may be 
other cases of high interest that could have had an impact on the study that 
unfortunately have not been considered. 
 
This study only covers B2B2 industrial engineering companies; hence the outcome 
may not be as applicable to other industries.  
 
1.7 Target group 
This thesis is principally written for the academia and for Alfa Laval. Additionally, 
every participating stakeholder is considered as secondary target group. Since the 
subject is of such a newsworthy kind, anyone doing business in China or with just 
interest in the Chinese market is recommended by the authors to take part of this 
thesis.  
                                                      
2 B2B (business to business) – activities that occur between businesses and other businesses 
rather than between businesses and consumers. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Sequence of work 
The work of this master thesis has stretched over 20 weeks and has generally 
consisted of phases representing chapters of the final report. 
 
Figure 1: Sequence of work. 
Initiate purpose and scope 
This master thesis has been written in collaboration with Alfa Laval, Lund. It is the 
outcome based on Alfa Laval’s current needs concerning their present situation 
regarding commodity CHEs on the Chinese market. Consequently, the first issue that 
needed to be taken care of was to integrate Alfa Laval’s demands with the academic 
requirements. Therefore, the authors conducted brief interviews with the different 
functions within Alfa Laval that had an interest in the thesis. Along discussions with 
the university supervisors, the purpose and scope of the master thesis was initiated. 
 
Methodological approach 
The methodology used for the thesis was decided to fit the purpose and scope. The 
activities needed for the thesis was determined. The methodology was modified when 
the literature and empirical studies was completed in order to correspond to the actual 
methods used. 
 
Literature study 
The literature study started using Lund University networks ELIN and LOVISA after 
brief discussions with the university supervisors. The theoretical framework was 
formed after finding multiple books and/or articles on the topics, preferably from 
various authors in order to add supplementary perspectives. Furthermore, reports and 
articles originating from consultancy firms McKinsey & Company, Bain & Company, 
Booz Allen Hamilton, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Swedish Trade Council where 
added as additional secondary sources of empirical data. 
 
Data collection 
Internal interviews 
In the beginning interviews were held with representatives from different functions 
and business areas at Alfa Laval headquarters in Lund. These added to the generating 
????????
????????????
??????
????????????????
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of the thesis purpose as well as an empirical base when reflecting over the market 
situation.  
 
During one month, the authors worked from Alfa Laval’s office in Shanghai, China, 
conducting both internal and external research. In order to well understand the local 
demands and processes, interviews were held with key employees in HR, marketing, 
sales, production, R&D, and finance. 
 
Benchmarking study 
The benchmarking study in this thesis focused on nine Scandinavian multinational 
industrial engineering companies, including Alfa Laval. Not one is in direct 
competition with Alfa Laval but they all face and/or have faced similar challenges. 
These interviews were conducted with company representatives from both corporate 
headquarters and China. 
 
Other sources 
The authors arranged a workshop with three local Chinese professors. Interviews 
were also held with the Swedish Trade Council and the Swedish General Consulate. 
Additionally, a discussion was held with Jan-Erik Vahlne, Professor of International 
Business at the School of Business, Economics and Law at Gothenburg University. 
 
Analysis 
The authors’ theoretical framework was compared with the empirical findings during 
the analysis. In the end, the Uppsala internationalisation model was merged with 
good-enough market theory. 
 
Conclusions 
The final commission of the research was to summarize the analysis and findings. 
The key findings of the research is presented and emphasised in the final chapter of 
this thesis. 
 
2.2 Methodological approach 
Research can be discussed as a method to increase the accumulated amount of 
knowledge through the collaboration and fit between a pyramid’s three nodes: 
paradigm, methodology, and problem (see Figure 2). A researcher’s hypotheses and 
assumptions concerning reality and knowledge develop into paradigms while 
methodology relates to the available methods and techniques when obtaining the 
higher knowledge. The problem concerns the research issue of focus (Nilsson, 1994). 
The thesis authors used a deductive method and positivistic assumptions when 
solving the problem of this thesis. 
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Figure 2: Three nodes of research. Source: Nilsson, 1994 
2.2.1 Deductive method 
Research can be conducted through various ways, typically related to either the 
empirical or the theoretical world. During this research, a deductive method has been 
used, which means developing theory from theory. The theories have been tested in 
contrast to the empirical findings of the benchmarking study in order to verify their 
applicability and to examine the validity, which is known as empirical research 
(Nilsson, 1994). The last undertaking was to combine the theories and to verify this 
theoretical merger. 
 
2.2.2 Positivistic paradigm 
The definitions of the types of paradigms differ between authors. E.g. Morgan (1980) 
distinguishes four types of paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical-humanist, 
and radical-structuralist while Gephart (1999) discusses three types: positivism, 
interpretism, and critical theory/postmodernism. Additionally, Nilsson (1994) 
discusses and defines the analytical, systems theoretical, and interpretive paradigms. 
 
Gephart’s (1999) positivistic paradigm has been the main foundation for the thesis 
authors’ working perspective during the research process, although other authors’ 
paradigms with the same denotation can be recognized. The key focus during the 
study has been to distinguish the circumstances when the benchmarking companies 
have acted. To verify hypotheses and the theory merger’s applicability is also a 
method according to positivism. Trying to recognize an industrial pattern of the 
benchmarking companies is practically comparable to finding an objective reality as 
in the case of positivism as well as in both Morgan’s (1980) functionalist paradigm 
and in Nilsson’s (1994) systems theoretical paradigm. The systems theoretical 
paradigm focuses on the relation between entities. One can model systems and 
situations from a structural perspective, focusing on situations at given points of time 
in order to clarify the current states (Nilsson, 1994). This research has focused on 
decisions and events on strategic levels at each company. The functionalist paradigm 
assumes ordered and regulated state of affairs while it focuses on understanding the 
situation in a manner that can generate useful empirical data (Morgan, 1980). This 
means that among the benchmarking companies, each event and actions taken can be 
compared and analysed since practically the same situations, or functions, have been 
studied from the same perspectives.  
 
?????????
???????????? ????????
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To sum up, although the systems theoretical and functionalist paradigms could be 
used to describe the approach, the overall applied paradigm has been the positivistic. 
This given the fact that positivism assumes that situations can be portrayed by 
knowledge or theories and since its key focus is to find related aspects and variables 
that generate the actions of organisations (Gephart, 1999), very similar to this 
benchmarking study. Additionally, positivism uses different approaches or interview 
objects when doing qualitative studies (Gephart, 1999), which the thesis authors 
accomplished by aiming to interview representatives from different functions at the 
companies. 
 
2.3 Empirical data collection 
The major gathering of empirical data has been conducted according to a 
benchmarking methodology. These have inevitably had a subjective perspective from 
each interviewee. The Swedish General Consulate and the Swedish Trade Council 
was contacted in order to understand the historical establishment of Swedish 
companies in China and also to get their view and opinions on the situation. These 
sources was approached because of their long presence in China and for the reason of 
their Scandinavian origin, hence hopefully the same business mentality as of the 
benchmarked companies. 
 
A workshop was held with local Chinese professors representing the fields of 
International Business & Management and Management of Organizations. During the 
workshop, the issues of the thesis problem discussion were discussed. The objective 
was to get local experts’ points of view to the situation and what the possibilities and 
opportunities are according to them.  
 
Additionally, a discussion with Jan-Erik Vahlne was held. He is a Professor of 
International Business at the School of Business, Economics and Law at Gothenburg 
University, and is one of the original authors of the Uppsala model. The reason was to 
get his view of the thesis authors’ theoretical framework and to add further insights 
and perspectives to the research. 
 
2.3.1 Benchmarking study 
According to Karlöf (1997) a benchmarking study is a tool with several benefits when 
applying to both strategically and operational issues, with strategy clarified as actions 
done in order to generate future prosperity. In order to compare strategies and 
presumably distinguish an industrial behaviour, the choice of benchmarking against 
similar companies was therefore made. The objective was to study under which 
circumstances the chosen strategy was decided, and important milestones and key 
issues during the actual implementation. There was an option to only study one case 
company but this was discarded since the relevance of such a research would not be 
as significant as benchmark against several companies. 
 
Camp (1993) distinguishes four types of benchmarks: internal, competitive, 
functional and generic. The benchmarking conducted by the authors is functional. 
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This is done on companies not solely with direct competing products. The potential is 
considered vast when studying other industries that still have similar functions, for 
example when studying time-to-market, R&D efficiency, human resources issues, 
logistics, and/or as in this case, how to act upon the changing mid-range market in 
China. 
 
There are several advantages with functional benchmarking such as it is easier to 
create interest for the investigation at the benchmarking companies. The issue with 
information confidentiality becomes less of a problem if the companies are not 
competitors, and the other companies are often interested in the result if they are also 
facing the same concerns. A functional benchmarking is supposed to often have a 
more objective approach. This has been supported in cases with lack of specific 
product involvement; where the acceptance level of the result has been higher (Camp, 
1989). The thesis authors did not have any experience from any of the studied 
industries. A final version of the thesis will be distributed to every participating 
company and other stakeholders as a noble gesture of gratitude. 
2.3.1.1 Benchmarking wheel 
The thesis authors have chosen the benchmarking wheel method of conducting the 
benchmarking study (see Figure 3). The purpose of this model is to present a process 
of five steps when conducting a benchmarking study. It is a general process that is 
relevant independent on the study’s outcome, whether it fulfils the hypothesis or not 
(Andersen & Moen, 1999). 
 
Figure 3: Benchmarking wheel. Source: Andersen & Moen, 1999 
Plan 
The benchmarking team consisted of only the two thesis authors. In this first phase, 
the thesis authors decided what the benchmarking’s focus should be and what should 
be prioritised. The thesis authors studied secondary data and consulted internal Alfa 
Laval stakeholders in order to set the focus. The chosen focus was divided into five 
parts that also formed the agenda for the interviews (see Appendix - Agenda, page 
77). Priority was on each company’s interpretation of the market today and their 
reasoning concerning their China-strategies. 
 
 
?????
?????
????????????????
? ??????
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Find 
Eisenhardt (1989) claims that although there are not an ideal amount of cases to study 
when benchmarking, a number between four and ten typically works well. More cases 
usually add too much complexity to the research. The thesis authors chose to be in the 
higher range in order to increase the likelihood of finding case organisations that has 
reached an as mature phase in their China establishment as possible and hopefully 
that are also targeting the good-enough market. Certain criterions for the 
benchmarking companies were set before choosing them. The following were set: 
 
• Engineering industries – A benchmarking study with other CHE 
manufacturers would not be possible. Therefore, the criteria were expanded 
to industrial engineering companies. 
• B2B – All companies need to deal with deal with industrial procurement and 
B2B activities, thus not sell its products to the end customer. 
• Long product lifecycles – In order to benchmark companies with similar 
functions and processes as Alfa Laval, the development of products with long 
product lifecycles were set. This meaning that a company can sell a specific 
technology for a long period of time. 
• Scandinavian origin – Organisational cultures vary between countries 
(Hofstede, 2005), which make it important to compare similar leadership 
styles when studying control systems and methods. Having organisations 
originating from Scandinavia is therefore crucial for the benchmarking 
companies. 
• Multinational – Being a global company with activities in a vast number of 
countries adds similarity to the benchmarking companies. 
• Chinese R&D – That the company has some kind of R&D function in China. 
The selected companies all have at least a group of engineers working with 
local adaptation of its products. 
 
Apart from Alfa Laval, among the identified companies that met the criterions, the 
following were approached and accepted their involvement in the study; ABB 
Robotics, ASSA ABLOY, Danfoss, Dynapac, Höganäs, Sandvik, SKF, and Tetra 
Pak.  
 
Collect 
Based upon the agenda, a list of interview questions were created and interviews were 
carried out. See chapter 2.3.1.2 Benchmarking interviews, for an in-depth clarification 
of the interviews that represent the majority of the collected data. 
 
Analyse 
Every interview object has read the empirical data that the analysis is based on in 
order to confirm its reliability. In order to perform a proper analysis, the collected 
data was structured in four issues so that the different companies could be compared 
and eventual gaps between them could be studied further. Each company’s data is 
divided and presented according to each issue. First, a summary of each company’s 
business and its historical establishment in China is presented. Secondly, each 
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company’s situation and perception of the Chinese market is presented. Thirdly, each 
company’s R&D activities in China are presented. Finally, other interesting issues 
that have been noted along the research are presented. The analysis was structured to 
examine the Uppsala internationalisation model’s applicability, the companies’ 
attitudes toward the good-enough market and how this is related. 
 
Improve 
The final phase of the benchmarking aims to carry out appropriate changes based on 
the study’s input. This part is excluded in our case since the thesis authors does not 
represent an organisation for such intention.  
2.3.1.2 Benchmarking interviews 
The interviews for the benchmarking study followed a semi-structured approach, 
which is a combination of structured approach; which has strict interview manuals 
and in advance the knowledge of possible answers, and unstructured approach; which 
are of a general kind and the interviewer only offers the topic as a guideline. The 
semi-structured approach has the option of being structured but the order of the 
questions can vary, and the depth of possible answers is not known in the beginning 
(Bryman & Bell, 2005). It could be described as flexible interviews with structure.  
 
All interviewees were prior to the interview sent an agenda (see Appendix - Agenda, 
page 77) in order to be properly prepared. The benchmarking focus was divided into 
five parts that also formed this agenda: 
 
1. Historical establishment in China 
2. Strategic reasons 
3. The Chinese market today and current R&D activities 
4. Pre-studies and lessons learned 
5. HR-management in China (this focus is especially for the thesis submitter, 
Alfa Laval, and is not dealt with in this master thesis) 
 
During the interviews, the authors used a list of questions as a guideline (see 
Appendix - Questionnaire, page 78). These questions were however not strictly 
followed; the chosen questions were dependent of each situation and the 
interviewee’s area of expertise. The thesis authors set the questions in order to suit the 
focus of the benchmarking and they were chosen in collaboration with the supervisors 
at Lund University as well as with the Alfa Laval supervisor. 
 
The respondents at each benchmarking company were chosen in collaboration with 
each company dependent on their availability. The authors’ strive was to interview 
people who had been part during the decision-making process concerning chosen 
China-strategies as well as people actively working towards or in the Chinese market 
today. This resulted in various representing positions; i.e. global President, local 
President, global R&D Manager, local R&D Manager, Production Manager, 
Integration Manager, Sales Manager, and HR Manager. The number of interviews 
with each company was not decided beforehand since the authors wanted to be 
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flexible if an interesting opportunity or aspect arose and a company was willing to 
agree on further interviews.  
 
Whenever possible, the interviews were held face-to-face but a couple of interviews 
had to be carried out over telephone. Every interview except one was held by both the 
authors in order to add reliability to the interview reproduction. Directly after every 
interview, each author wrote a summary. The two summaries were later combined to 
one document after a dialogue between the thesis authors. 
 
2.3.2 Secondary data 
A majority of the empirical studies were performed through the benchmarking study 
and little was collected as secondary data. However, in order to broaden the 
perspectives, secondary sources of data were used. The thesis authors were interested 
in how published literature experienced the situation, which parts of the theoretical 
framework that were supported. Several China-related articles and reports were read. 
The university library networks ELIN and LOVISA were used to find some of these 
articles. Used key-words when finding relevant articles were for example, China, 
developing markets, emerging countries, M&A, growth strategy, good-enough, and 
middle market. 
 
With many companies facing similar issues as Alfa Laval, the Chinese market is a hot 
topic and several consultancy firms have helped other MNCs in China. Some of these 
have published reports and articles that the thesis authors also examined. Since most 
of this data do not have any references and its validity may thereby be questioned, the 
thesis authors studied these with cautiousness. The reports and articles originated 
from McKinsey & Co, Bain & Co, Booz Allen Hamilton, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
and Swedish Trade Council.  
 
2.4 Methodological reflections 
The option of comparing and benchmarking against nine companies was made under 
the presumptions of that not all companies would be as eager to participate fully and 
not all cases would be as relevant and/or interesting as others. However, the thesis 
authors were aware that having nine participating companies could generate so much 
data that it could become difficult to deal with. It could result in having companies 
within very different industries; hence the result could become less significant. 
Having many benchmarking companies was practically a tool within the Find-phase 
in Andersen & Moen’s (1999) Benchmarking wheel. It was a tool in the sense that the 
thesis authors managed to find companies among other companies that were more 
interesting for the thesis as well as were more eager to participate in the study, hence 
the different amount of data concerning the different companies.  
 
In regards that the companies are not dealing with the same businesses, the 
benchmarking study’s kind was chosen according the purpose of studying functional 
activities such as further establishment on a market and R&D activities, and not how 
to best manufacture the frames for a CHE. Furthermore, it would have been very 
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difficult to have Alfa Laval’s competitors such as GEA and APV to participate in a 
relevant manner in this benchmarking study. With companies not directly competing 
with each other, and some that are part of the same value chain as others, the thesis 
authors believe that the studied companies have supplied them with relevant answers. 
Nevertheless, most of these companies are facing the same issues and are therefore 
interested in the study’s outcome.  
 
The reproduced empirical data could be criticised of lack of reliability since they have 
not been recorded. The thesis authors chose to not record the interviews because of 
the great amount of interviews that were going to be conducted. To listen to around 
40 interviews a second time and then reproduce them literally was considered to take 
to much time. In spite of everything, the thesis authors only had 20 weeks at their 
disposal. This issue has also been tackled by the fact that all the participating 
companies have read through the empirical findings and have given their consent 
regarding its contents. The around 40 interviews are nevertheless seen by the thesis 
authors as a factor that adds reliability through its vast amount of perspectives that 
actually have affected the research.  
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 17 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
There is a great fascination with multinational companies. They are viewed as huge 
power machines with infinite capacity. But a lot of these multinational companies 
started out small and more importantly started their internationalisation process with 
incremental steps. The internationalisation process is a phrase that is used extensively 
in the literature but rarely clearly defined. The definition of internationalisation for 
this thesis is “The process of increasing involvement in international operations” 
(Morgan & Katsikeas, 1997). This means that the thesis authors are not only 
regarding the internationalisation process as an outward/foreign expansion of a 
company’s operations, but rather as an extension of a company’s international 
activities. 
 
3.1 Uppsala internationalisation model – the Uppsala school 
The Uppsala internationalisation model tries to find a common structure that is 
primarily based on knowledge. The model was first developed in the 1970s by 
empirical studies of the behaviour of Swedish companies when establishing 
themselves in foreign countries. It showed that companies develop investments with 
increased knowledge and experience of the new market. They found two particular 
interesting aspects (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). One was the correlation between the 
order of a foreign expansion and the psychic distance. The second was the 
establishment chain.  
 
Physic distance is defined by the authors as the total sum of factors that are 
obstructing information flow to or from the certain market. Factors can be social, like 
language problems, difference in education systems and culture differences or they 
can be structural like difference in business practices, laws and regulations and the 
level of industrial development. Thus the company will start internationalisation in 
countries with low psychic distance because these markets are more easily 
understandable hence reducing the perceived risks of an investment (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977).  
 
3.1.1 Establishment chain 
Based on previous empirical studies (Forsgren & Kinch, 1970; Hörnell, Vahlne & 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson, 1996), the 
authors could also conclude holistic pattern. Almost all foreign subsidiaries to the 
studied Swedish industries – pharmaceutical, engineering, pulp and paper and steel, 
have been established following a distinct “Establish Chain” (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977): 
 
1. The firm have no or sporadic exports to the market.  
2. An agreement with an established agent is formed after some time to serve 
new customers.  
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3. After a few years with increasing sales, the company establishes wholly 
owned sales subsidiary or acquires a former agent.  
4. The subsidiaries get more involved with incremental implementation of 
production, by starting with the simplest products and over time adding more 
complicated ranges.  
 
Almost all the sales subsidiaries started through the acquisition of a former agent or 
through a person formerly employed by a former agent. With the acquisition, a sales 
organisation was formed and is generally followed by a production unit if the market 
proved large enough (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The companies can stray from the 
set path of establishments by not doing things in the suggested order. But that usually 
only happens when experiential and extensive market knowledge existed within the 
organisation (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). In later works, the authors 
expressly comments that the speed or order of the establishment chain can vary with 
company internal factors (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). According to Vahlne, people 
learn and make decisions in fashions similar to those many years back (Vahlne, 
2008). 
 
In order to explain the clear pattern of the establishment chain, the authors, Jan 
Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne, made some basic assumptions when setting out to 
create the model. Firstly, companies tend to first develop in the domestic market, both 
geographically and market wise. Then it is assumed that the most important 
impediments for expansion abroad are lack of knowledge and resources. Thirdly, the 
firm is assumed to have long-term profit as their main goal, which is interpreted by 
the authors as long-term growth. In order to fulfil the goal it is assumed to have a 
strive to reduce risk taking within in the organisation that pervades the decision-
making at all levels. The last assumption is that any internationalisation process is the 
result of a series of independent incremental steps and not the result of an optimal 
strategy. The last assumption is an important part of the model. It actually states two 
fundamental building blocks of the model. First, that the decision of 
internationalisation is not relevant to the process model. Secondly, that the process 
most likely starts in a country with a similar culture or business practice. Here lies the 
core question of the model, the balance between market force and the knowledge 
available within the company (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
 
3.1.2 The four mechanisms for the internationalisation process 
Johanson & Vahlne identified four main mechanisms for the internationalisation 
process. Two of them concern the present state of internationalisation: market 
commitment and market knowledge. The other two deals with the change aspect of 
the process; current business activities and commitment decisions – see Figure 4. The 
model is dynamic which means the output of one cycle is the input on the next cycle.   
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Figure 4: The basic mechanism of internationalisation. Source: Johanson & Vahlne, 1977 
The concept of market commitment contains both the amount of resources committed 
to the market and how committed those resources are to that specific market. 
Resources deployed at a certain market are usually quite easy to grasp. It is generally 
the size of the total investments in the particular market. The investments could be 
within marketing, organisation, personnel and so on. But the real issue lies in the 
degree of commitment of those resources. A resource is considered deeply committed 
if it is market specific, integrated with other parts of the firm or integrated vertically 
with the market. Marketing resources are a good example of that. A resource that is 
on paper easily transferable to other markets can in reality be deeply committed to a 
specific market because of efficiency issues. For example a production unit located in 
a market can in theory be a kind of resource transferable to other market by producing 
units with other market requirements, but only after investing a substantial amount of 
money to rebuild the production lines and retraining of personnel. There are a risk of 
that the production unit will not be cost efficient in that new market (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). 
 
Market knowledge is perhaps the most crucial element in the Uppsala model because 
this affects so many other mechanisms. The authors use the Penrose definition of 
knowledge. There are two types of knowledge- one that can be taught and transferred 
between people are called objective knowledge, the other one can only be learned 
through personal experience and cannot be transmitted to others are called 
experiential knowledge (Penrose, 1959). Since experiential market knowledge is 
harder to acquire than objective, it has to be gained successively through having 
continuous operations in a market. The importance is increased when the activities are 
less structured and knowledge intensive, such as in marketing activities. The 
experiential knowledge provides the basic framework in which identified 
opportunities are acted upon; it is the logics behind the decisions. Johanson & Vahlne 
(1977) also distinguishes between general knowledge and market specific knowledge. 
General knowledge is common best practices, customer traits or production methods 
that hold true regardless of your current geographical position. The market specific 
knowledge concerns the national or regional market only. It is the differences in 
business culture, customer characteristics or the traits and wishes of the local 
personnel. The market specific knowledge need to have operation in a foreign market 
is mostly gained through experience and cannot be transferred between countries. 
Market knowledge is a resource, sometimes more specifically viewed as a human 
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resource. When market knowledge increases so will its value as a resource, hence 
increasing the commitment to that market. 
 
The third concept of current activities is a great resource driver, because it will always 
be some sort of time lag between a performed activity and the results of that activity. 
That time binds the resource to a certain market and becomes a commitment. Current 
activities are the prime source of experiential knowledge in a market. The authors 
distinguish between the firm experience that can only be gained trough working 
within the organisation and market experience that the firm can be gained by hiring 
experienced personnel. This is one of the reasons of why internationalisation 
processes generally are slow in progress, the necessary market experience may not be 
available for hiring or the newly hired personnel need to be slowly integrated into the 
organisation. A long learning process is only obtained through the current activities 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
 
The last mechanism is that about deciding to commit resources to international 
operations. It is assumed that decisions are made as a response to raised problems or 
opportunities on a market. The perception of threats or opportunities is, as already 
mentioned, dependent on the experiential knowledge available on the firm and on the 
market – hence these situations are usually discovered by those who are responsible 
for operations on the market. Then it is reasonable to assume that whatever solution 
or response will be related to the current activities performed in that market and 
usually related to some sort of extension of market commitment (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). 
 
Johanson & Vahlne (1977) mean that scale-increasing decisions will only be taken 
when current market risks are lower than the maximum tolerable market risks for the 
company. The maximum tolerable market risk depends on the company’s strategy 
when it comes to risk taking and the amount of resources available within the 
organisation. The current market risk depends on the current degree of market 
commitment for the company and the amount of market uncertainty the organisation 
feels. The uncertainty can have external reasons like an unstable market, new 
competitors or rapidly changing political situations, or be an internal uncertainty 
because of the lack of market experience. The conclusion drawn by the authors is that 
scale increasing decisions which is risk increasing decisions, will only be made if the 
company already possesses a large amount of local resources and there is little 
uncertainty about the market or if it is a fast expanding market. The conclusion is that 
all commitment decisions are small and incremental unless the company has very 
large resource and/or the market is considered very stable or extensive market 
experience from other similar markets. Market growth is only acting as catalyst; it 
will speed of the process but is never the main factor behind a commitment decision 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
 
3.2 The industrial network approach 
Both the previous mentioned theories of internationalisation process, the Uppsala 
model and the Eclectic paradigm, regards the company as an independent entity. 
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Individuals within the organisation with regards to the accessible market information 
make all decisions. The industrial network approach however focuses on the 
industrial systems that exist around the company. An industrial system is a network of 
companies that together produce, distributes, and uses goods or services. Between 
each other they have long and lasting relationships that are sometimes important 
competitive advantages (Johanson & Mattsson, 1988). The internationalisation 
process is in this theory described as an interaction process between the company and 
its suppliers and customers. How the interaction turns out depends on four variables. 
1) How does the interaction process look like? 2) What are the characteristics of the 
relationship between the involved parties; are they suppliers and buyers or are they 
cooperating? 3) What is the current atmosphere of the interaction? 4) How is the 
general environment in which the interaction takes place? (Whitelock, 2002) 
 
This means that the company need not only consider its own position relative to its 
customers and suppliers, but also take into account the environment in a new market 
for the other actors in its industrial network (Whitelock, 2002). 
 
3.3 Comparing internationalisation theories 
All two theories presented above represent a distinct field within internationalisation 
research. The common traits include a heavy dependence on reliable and up to date 
market information in order to make the decisions. The industrial network approach 
require a number of market factors that affects the mode of entry on the market, hence 
extensive information about those factors are crucial. The Uppsala industrialisation 
model regards market information, specially the kind that are based on experiential 
knowledge to be the crucial indicator of whether a market entry should be made and 
what kind of entry mode that should be selected (Whitelock, 2002).  
 
In comparison with the network approach the Uppsala model focuses fundamentally 
on the firm and its actions. The Uppsala model has been criticised to pay little 
attention to the competition of the market since the model only has one explanatory 
variable – the firm knowledge (Andersen, 1993; Morgan & Katsikeas, 1997; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). It may be argued that the emphasis on experiential 
knowledge must also include knowledge of other factors and competitors influencing 
the market. In later works Johanson and Vahlne has acknowledged the need for more 
external variables as input, especially the need of investigating the relationships with 
other bodies in a foreign market (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). They mean that the 
business relationships in an industrial network are often subtle processes and can only 
be understood through interaction inside a network. Hence the network information is 
experience-based knowledge from current activities. So an industrial network 
approach can be combined with the Uppsala internationalisation model (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1990). The Uppsala model has also been criticised for 1) not explaining why 
or how the internationalisation process starts, 2) that the definition of commitment is 
very vague and in some places overlaps the definition of knowledge as an intangible 
resource commitment and 3) that it lacks explanation of how knowledge affects 
commitment (Andersen, 2003). 
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The thesis authors have chosen to regard the Uppsala model as their main 
internationalisation process model. There are several both theoretical and practical 
advantages with the Uppsala model compared with the other theories.  
 
• The model dates back over 30 years but is still relevant, which means it has 
survived the test of time. The model has a proven record of validity with 
many international studies and works confirming the internationalisation 
process and the establishment chain (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990).  
• Our study is based on an empirical benchmarking study, just like the studies 
that formed the model. Johanson and Vahlne’s empirical studies were mostly 
concentrated on Swedish manufacturing industries (Johanson & 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), many of which are also present in our study. 
• The model has been criticised for being too deterministic since it doesn’t 
reflect the market conditions (Reid, 1983) and only applicable on the early 
stages of the internationalisation process, but for this thesis, it is regarded as 
an opportunity to develop the model.  
• The Uppsala internationalisation model is the only internationalisation model 
that discusses the important of experience and the psychic distance, which the 
thesis authors believe is a very important factor when dealing with a country 
like China. 
• The Uppsala model rests on behavioural theories (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990) 
rather than rational decisions based on perfect information. This thesis has the 
ambition of finding some sort of industry behaviour and assumes the lack of 
perfect information; the model fitted our purpose and delimitations better.  
• Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the Uppsala model is a dynamic theory. 
It postulates changes of factors and views of internationalisation decisions 
over time. The thesis authors regard it a necessary presumption for today’s 
globalised and fast changing markets and hi-tech industries.  
 
3.4 The good-enough market 
During the last three decades, protectionist barriers have been dissolved in many 
developing countries. Developing countries are becoming more and more exploited. 
While many Western corporations have stomped in and gained market shares and 
acquired local companies, some local companies have managed to retaliate. By 
offering products with a little less quality than MNCs offer and having superior 
market knowledge, local companies in developing countries are having the major part 
of the middle market. They have restructured their businesses, exploited new 
opportunities, and are today not only posing a threat but are in fact competing with 
Western MNCs. In China there are cases like Baosteel, Galanz, TCL, Lenovo and 
Huawei Technologies, which confirm that successful stories do exist (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2006; Gao, Woetzel & Wu, 2006; Tse, 2007).  
 
3.4.1 Market segmentation 
The changes that have occurred in developing countries over the years have shaped 
their markets differently from the markets that typical Western MNCs are used to. 
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Most developing markets consist of three or four layers and there are various 
definitions of these. The segmentation is often also applicable to the markets for 
talent and capital and represent about the same proportions. Khanna & Palepu (2006) 
distinguishes the global, glocal, local, and bottom markets. Another definition is the 
premium, good-enough, and low-end markets (Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007), see 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Segmentation pyramid: market segmentation in developing countries. Source: Gadiesh, 
Leung & Vestring, 2007; Khanna & Palepu, 2006 
The global, or premium market as it will be referred to in the rest of the thesis, is 
where global customers seek products of global quality, with global features, and are 
prepared to pay global prices for them (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). In other words, the 
products are typical high-end products purchased by customers who recognises 
quality and has considerable purchasing power (Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007). 
 
The market of focus in this thesis is the glocal or good-enough market, although the 
used term in this thesis is the good-enough market. This is a segment that demands 
products similar to premium quality, but with fewer features and at cheaper prices 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2006). They are produced locally and sold primarily to rapidly 
expanding local companies that request value for money (Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 
2007). 
 
The local, or low-end market as it will be referred to in the rest of this thesis; 
demands locally produced products of lower quality that basically meet the 
requirement of functionality (Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007) and with a price set 
accordingly. At the base of the pyramid we find what sometimes are called the bottom 
segment, which can and are in this thesis, included as a part of the low-end segment. 
This market is for the customers who can only afford to buy the most inexpensive 
products (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). 
 
MNCs encounter several problems when venturing down from premium to good-
enough markets. The common theme is however insufficiency - the lack of 
knowledge and insufficient infrastructure. Most companies lack market research 
concerning how to understand local customers, they are inexperienced with 
underdeveloped distribution networks and do not know how to deliver beyond the 
most developed areas. In the case of talent markets, MNCs most often do not have 
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enough knowledge concerning how to attract, motivate, and retain employees, which 
is often crucial for local success (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). 
 
Many industries in China, both business to consumer and B2B ones, are experiencing 
a good-enough market that are nurturing on the expense of both the low-end and 
premium segments. In some industries it already accounts for half the market share. 
Expanding companies are trading up from low-end products and components while 
wealthy corporations start to accept locally produced alternatives that are less 
expensive but still possess reasonable quality (Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007).  
 
China is in many industries considered an essential market for companies that want to 
succeed globally. China often plays an important role for companies when preparing 
to utilise opportunities and enhance their position in other developing countries. Local 
Chinese companies are consolidating and strengthening their positions at home before 
expanding globally. For some industries, the Chinese good-enough market will be the 
main battleground for the entire global market. The challenges of competing on this 
market are however several. The number of competitors is greater, price points are 
lower, business models are different, and there is the, almost unavoidable, conflict of 
cannibalising on your own premium products and harming your company brand 
(Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007).  
 
3.4.2 Strategies of entering the good-enough market 
There are two methods for MNCs to enter good-enough markets; from above through 
downgrading of existing products and services; and through M&A. Independently of 
the chosen method, the first task when entering the good-enough market is to 
recognize and evaluate its importance. One has to determine if it as a market with 
enough potential to enter, and that is necessary to do so. If so – the next question is 
when to enter. It depends on the trends within the premium segment; if it is still 
growing, if returns are still large, etc. MNCs considering entering the good-enough 
market have to do scrupulous market and competitor analyses, and thorough customer 
segmentation analyses. Top management need to point out critical success factors 
concerning everything from branding to pricing to distribution (Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring, 2007). 
 
For MNCs experiencing stable premium markets, the good-enough market is not 
recommended. Probably the customers are still willing to pay more for reliability in 
spite of several low-cost alternatives. They should instead focus on lowering costs 
and further differentiate their products on the premium market. If their competitive 
position is weak or eroding it is suggested to also try to differentiate through 
innovation. However, if the premium market’s growth is slow and returns are getting 
smaller, the good-enough market could be highly attractive. Figure 6: “Should you 
enter the middle market,” presents the suggested actions whether entering or not 
based on the premium market’s situation and on which competitive position a 
company has. It is proposed that even companies that because of their major position 
have chosen to not enter a lower segment should continually reconsider their 
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decisions to facilitate themselves against emerging competitors (Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 6: Should you enter the middle market. The x-axis represents the state 
of the premium market in the country of focus. The y-axis represents the 
company’s competitive position in this country. Source: Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring, 2007 
3.4.2.1 Entering from above 
A major concern when entering the good-enough market should be the 
cannibalisation of existing products. It could have a negative effect on high margin 
premium sales, both through cannibalisation by also through harming the brand. If a 
traditional premium product producing company starts to produce lower quality 
products it can loose its reliability among existing premium customers. It is therefore 
important to understand the actual difference between the premium and good-enough 
markets. In some cases there can be a geographical factor that makes it possible to 
introduce good-enough products in areas were the premium segment does not exist, 
but still keep exploiting the premium market in another areas. Another aspect that 
needs to be taken into consideration is how the definitions of premium and good-
enough will change, and how their segment frontier will adjust (Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring, 2007). 
 
MNCs aiming to enter the good-enough market from above do this through lowering 
their manufacturing costs, develop and introduce simplified products and services 
with less features, and extending their existing distribution network. However, the 
product quality remains at a reasonable level. One important question remains 
though; if it is possible to benefit from lower procurement costs, larger manufacturing 
scale, distribution synergies. Then the issue of how to adapt the organisation for this 
change comes into focus. New needs and issues will arise such as designing new 
products and services, branding, and sales approach for attracting good-enough 
customers. All this without weakening the company’s position and brand on the 
premium market. Proposed actions are to assemble teams whose only objective is to 
study the observed opportunity and its required dedication of resources. Additionally, 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 26
one should to close research on local competitors’ cost structures in order to 
understand how they profit from their business while still being so inexpensive 
towards customers. Local material sourcing may just not be enough when trying to 
match local companies production costs (Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007). 
3.4.2.2 Entering through mergers & acquisitions 
If the option of lowering the costs is not manageable quickly enough there is the 
option of mergers and acquisitions. This option is for both companies with strong, 
eroding, and weak competitive positions. Ever since China entered the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 the number of mergers and acquisitions by foreign companies in 
China has increased greatly. The approval processes when foreign companies acquire 
Chinese companies have nevertheless become stricter – the regulatory and political 
approval for mergers and acquisitions has become a major obstacle. Due to increasing 
public concerns about foreign companies gaining more and more ground in China, 
several deals have been opposed at provincial or ministerial (Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring, 2007). 
 
It might not be sufficient to draft an extensive business case; companies must be 
prepared to redraft cases during the acquisition process. It is proposed to include 
factors that are beneficial for local authorities and companies. One must be prepared 
to put a vast amount of time and resources in building sound relationships with key 
stakeholders. The deal’s structure, terms, and conditions may have to be adjusted 
several times. Successful MNCs, in terms of completing Chinese acquisitions, tend to 
have first used a clear strategy when finding the right acquisition candidate and later 
have overinvested in the due diligence process (Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007). 
 
The issue of potentially diminish the original brand has been avoided by some 
companies by keep on selling the original premium brand as premium brands and the 
acquired brand will continue to target the Chinese mass market. Gillette, Danone, 
L’Oréal, and Anheuser-Busch have acted this way. Through this approach, a 
company gains access to the good-enough market while preventing the acquired 
company from moving up segment wise towards the premium market. In spite of that 
these examples are consumer brands, it should be applicable to B2B companies as 
well according to Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring (2007). 
 
Companies in low-end markets also have the option of entering good-enough markets 
through acquisitions and mergers. An example is the case of computer company 
Lenovo who via a joint venture entered and prospered in the good-enough market in 
the 2005 bought IBM’s PC division and is now the third largest PC producer 
(Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring, 2007). 
3.4.2.3 Burrow up from below 
Companies in low-end markets are today moving up towards good-enough. The trend, 
from having hundreds of companies competing on the same market, is that low-end 
companies are consolidating and forming new corporations. With a growing customer 
base in the middle market that have become price sensitive, Chinese companies are 
now focusing on designing and launching products with somewhat lower quality than 
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premium ones but with higher margin than low-end products (Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring, 2007). 
 
Local Chinese companies moving towards the good-enough market face different 
obstacles than MNCs that enters from above. They often lack an adequate amount of 
managerial talent necessary. When doing international businesses, this becomes more 
evident. More and more Chinese students are getting education and training that fits 
better with international corporations’ managerial styles than current Chinese manner. 
The growth of China’s economy outpaces the education of future managers which 
also points at this problematic issue. Furthermore, the smaller size Chinese industries 
and their lack of sufficient management tools often generate problems such as to 
establish strong brands and to compete with MNCs through innovation. The required 
infrastructure in sales and distribution, branding activities, and R&D are not familiar 
to local companies in terms of understanding how to correlate and integrate these 
activities with the segment-specific needs of the good-enough market (Gadiesh, 
Leung & Vestring, 2007). 
 
Successful local companies that have arisen from low-end markets tend to have used 
three different strategies. The first is taking advantage of superior market knowledge 
and adapting to the special needs of local customers. Many companies have tailored 
their products to local customers and have developed a product for every identified 
need. Investing in not only urban areas but also in semi-urban and rural areas along 
with investment in after-sales services and distribution have been new approaches 
made by Chinese companies. Having their home experience as a foundation, some 
companies have also exploited the resemblance between the home market and other 
developing markets abroad. In order words, successful Chinese companies have often 
at first avoided confrontation with MNCs and instead focused on finding niche 
opportunities to capitalise from before entering the true global battle (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2006). 
 
Another group of companies have exploited their knowledge concerning the factors of 
local production and logistics and have thereby gained competitive advantage. Many 
MNCs find it difficult to find local talent with the sought skills and expertise – the 
talent pool is wide and the quality of applicants varies wildly because of the 
differences between local educational institutions. A local company knows better how 
to find and attract talent from semi-urban and rural areas than a MNC does. The 
experience of already working with poor infrastructural presumptions is another 
advantage local companies have (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). 
 
The third strategy concerns how local private sector businesses can take advantage of 
institutional voids. Some industries and institutions can only be set up by the 
government, although companies can act as intermediaries in product and factor 
markets. These intermediaries specially suits local companies since they are often 
manpower intensive and therefore require acquaintance with the language and culture, 
they are characterised by a vast amount of information that requires local expertise in 
order to analyse, and some institutions such as banks and media are of such kind that 
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the government do not want to drop control to foreign companies (Khanna & Palepu, 
2006). 
 
3.5 Theoretical framework of the study 
For this thesis, the theoretical framework is based on the combination of the Uppsala 
internationalisation model and the theory of good-enough markets in emerging 
countries. This thesis looks at establishments in good-enough markets as new 
establishments into a new market, at least for the benchmarking companies.  
 
The participating benchmarking companies are all quality focused and in the more 
mature markets, considered premium industrial brands. Entering a more price 
sensitive and competitor intensive market is, according to the thesis authors and Jan-
Erik Vahlne (2008), a step into a foreign market. The Uppsala model must be valid 
for further establishments in a foreign market since it is a dynamic model, subject to 
changes in circumstances and the amount of the knowledge. We regard it as a 
commitment development model within given risk constrains. 
 
The thesis authors are using the Uppsala model in its latest incarnation, the version 
that takes into account the relationships within industrial networks. The model’s basic 
assumptions are that all companies have uncertainties and bounded rationality when 
deciding about foreign or new establishments. The main factor that prevents new 
establishments is the psychic distance, which hinders information to flow from the 
market to the company. The psychic distance can be overcome with gradual 
commitment of resources as to gain knowledge about that certain market, which is 
time consuming.  
 
The knowledge needed for establishments is of both general character and of market 
specific character. The market specific knowledge develops from experience through 
the current activities and commitment decisions of the firm on that market. Here the 
assumption is that the acquired experiential knowledge makes it possible to develop 
foreign operations still more. We argue that market specific knowledge can be 
obtained through acquisition of companies with that experiential knowledge or by 
imitation as well.  
 
The thesis authors would like to avoid any discussions about knowledge and whether 
it is an intangible resource or not. Discussions with professor Vahlne has concluded 
in a generous definition of knowledge (Vahlne, 2008) and for this thesis, the concept 
of knowledge is both a resource that can be committed as well as a tool of perceiving 
opportunities on the market.  
 
Even though the theory about good-enough markets in emerging countries is not 
based on academic studies, the number of researched companies behind the articles is 
extensive. Alone, this may be considered qualified trends in emerging markets, but 
we believe that when integrated with the Uppsala model, it can be explanatory for the 
actions made by MNCs. 
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The issue of venturing towards a good-enough market is a case of business 
development, the same way internationalisation is. The processes and basic 
prerequisites are the same; experiential learning, commitments and trust building with 
partners. Hence the good-enough market theory needs the Uppsala model for process 
view and the Uppsala model develops with a theory concerning new business 
opportunities.  
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4 Empirical findings 
The thesis authors have chosen to present the empirical data divided in four major 
issues. First, a brief introduction of the participating benchmarking companies 
including a short business presentation and their historical Chinese establishment. 
Secondly, the focus has been on the Chinese market today and tomorrow, and each 
company’s situation and market perception. Thirdly, the R&D activities in China are 
presented for each of the benchmarking companies. Finally, other interesting issues 
according to the interviewed companies are highlighted. 
 
4.1 Presentation of the benchmarking companies and their China 
establishment 
Nine companies, including Alfa Laval, have been studied in this thesis. They all 
match the criteria mentioned in chapter 2.3.1.1 Benchmarking wheel.  
 
4.1.1 ABB Robotics 
The thesis authors interviewed ABB Robotics Global R&D Manager Charlotte B. 
Brogren who has worked within ABB since 1995. 
 
The ABB Group is a leading company in power and automation technologies. It 
consists of five divisions: Power Products, Power Systems, Automation Products, 
Process Automation, and Robotics. ABB’s vision is to help their customers to use 
electrical power efficiently, to increase industrial productivity and to lower 
environmental impact in a sustainable way (ABB Group Annual Report).  
 
The thesis authors have only studied ABB’s Robotics division, which is a leading 
supplier of industrial robots, modular manufacturing systems and service. ABB 
Robotics has installed over 160,000 robots worldwide. However, Robotics only 
accounts for 4% of the ABB Group’s overall revenues in 2007, and 18% of the 
Robotics revenues originates from Asia. 11% of ABB Group’s total revenues in 2007 
were generated in China (ABB Group Annual Report 2007). 
 
According to Robotics’ Global R&D Manager Charlotte Brogren, ABB Group has 
been present in China for about 30 years but Robotics has only had their own sales 
activities in China for about ten years. Today they have both manufacturing, and since 
three years back, also R&D in China.  
 
4.1.2 Alfa Laval 
At Alfa Laval, the thesis authors interviewed several company representatives in both 
Lund and Shanghai within the functions of sales, marketing, production, procurement, 
R&D and finance. 
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Please see chapters 1.3 Presentation of Alfa Laval and 1.3.1 China establishment for a 
presentation of Alfa Laval and its China establishment. 
 
4.1.3 ASSA ABLOY 
The interviewee in ASSA ABLOY is Ulf Södergren. He has been with the company 
since the year 2000, first as head of operations and since 2007 as the CTO (Chief 
Technology Officer). 
 
ASSA ABLOY is the global leader in door opening solutions. They focus on 
satisfying the end-users’ requests for security, safety and convenience. Founded in 
1994, ASSA ABLOY has grown from a regional company to an international group 
with 32,000 employees and sales over SEK 33 billion. With more than 150 
subsidiaries in over 40 countries they have more than 10% of the global market, and 
offer a more complete range of door opening solutions than any other company 
(ASSA ABLOY Annual Report 2007). 
 
ASSA ABLOY’s overall focus is to lead the industry trend towards increasing 
security with the customers in the centre when developing products. Their strategy 
has been divided in three focus areas: 1) Market presence through exploiting the 
strength of their brand portfolio, increasing growth in their core business, and through 
expanding into new markets and segments. 2) Product leadership by continually 
developing new products that increases the customer benefits and lowers the costs 
through using more product platforms with fewer components. 3) Increasing cost-
efficiency in all areas (ASSA ABLOY Annual Report 2007). 
 
ASSA ABLOY’s Asia Pacific division includes subsidiaries in Australia, New 
Zeeland, China, and the rest of Asia. The division has doubled its organic growth over 
the past year from 4% to 10%, had turnover of SEK 2,708 million, and employs over 
5,000 people. The headquarters are located in Hong Kong (ASSA ABLOY Annual 
Report 2007). 
 
In September 2000 ASSA ABLOY entered a joint venture with Williams PLC’s lock 
division - Yale Intruder Security, who had operations in China. At this time, ASSA 
ABLOY served the Chinese market only through a sales office located in Singapore. 
In January 2001 ASSA ABLOY acquired the remaining 40% of Yale. The Chinese 
company Guli Security Products, which was a part of Yale, was now fully owned. 
Guli had two main objectives: 1) to serve the Chinese market, and 2) to act as a low-
cost manufacturer for export markets (Södergren, 2008). In 2005 the company entered 
a new joint venture when acquiring 70% of Wang Li, specialised in high-security 
locks and doors for domestic use. The company is today exporting to North America, 
Europe and Southeast Asia. In late 2007 ASSA ABLOY acquired the Chinese high-
security lock company Baodean, which further strengthened their market leading 
position in China. Today, all ASSA ABLOY’s production facilities in China are 
producing for the local Chinese market. The ASSA ABLOY factory in Chaolan, Guli, 
has on top of this a very strong export. They have continued to invest in these 
facilities because of rising demands on the home market and in order to increase the 
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internal deliveries to Europe and North America. ASSA ABLOY’s sales in China 
represent about 2.5% of the group’s total sales (ASSA ABLOY Annual Report 2007). 
 
 
4.1.4 Danfoss 
The thesis authors interviewed five representatives within the Danfoss Group: CEO 
(Chief Executive Officer) Jørgen Clausen, Vice President Erhardt Jessen, Sales 
Manager Arthur Xu, Integration Officer & Administration Supervisor Christina Shen, 
and General Manager David Lu at Danfoss’ Chinese subsidiary Holip. Both Erhardt 
Jessen and Christina Shen are working at both Danfoss as well as at Holip. 
 
Founded in 1933, Danfoss is one of Denmark’s largest industrial companies. 
Headquartered in Norborg in southern Denmark, it is still a privately owned company 
with about 21,300 employees, factories in 25 different countries and hundreds of 
distributors and sales companies in all six continents (Danfoss Annual Report 2007).  
 
Danfoss develops and manufactures applications in the three core business areas, 
Motion Controls, Heating and Refrigeration & Air Conditioning. The company’s 
vision is to be global leaders in those three areas and to be a highly respected 
company that creates value for all kinds of stakeholders. The overall strategy is to 
become, or maintain, number one or two market position in all strategic core business 
areas and markets. The strategy is going to be realised by purchasing companies, to 
create innovative products, venture into new businesses that can strengthen the core 
business in the long run and develop the Danfoss brand (Danfoss Annual Report 
2007). 
 
In May 1994, Danfoss opened its first sales office in Hong Kong to market and sell 
Danfoss products in China. Later that year a representative office was established in 
Beijing, followed by another representative office in Shanghai the year after. The first 
factory started its operations in 1997 and by the year 2000, Danfoss put forward a 
new long-term strategy for the Chinese market – making it their “Second home 
market” (Clausen, 2008). Since 2000 four joint ventures have been made and in 2005 
Danfoss acquired Holip - one of the interviewed companies. Today Danfoss China 
has a turnover around RMB 2 billion, representing about 6-7% of Danfoss’ total sales, 
and employs about 2,500 persons, making China Danfoss’ fourth largest market 
(Clausen, 2008). 
 
4.1.5 Dynapac 
The interviewee at Dynapac is Per Berggren, Global R&D Manager who has worked 
within Dynapac during his entire career – since 1989. 
 
Dynapac is a global manufacturer of compaction and paving equipment such as 
rollers, pavers, planers, and rammers. Founded in 1934, today Dynapac has its head 
office in Stockholm and has eight production facilities in Sweden, Germany, France, 
Brazil, USA, and China. They are focusing on providing excellent machine 
performance, hence the success of their customers. The after-sales service is very 
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important and the sale of a machine is only considered the beginning of a partnership 
(Dynapac, 2008).  
 
Several different companies have owned Dynapac since the 90s. Between 1992-1999, 
Svedala Industri AB was the owner but was eventually acquired by Finnish Metso 
Corporation. In 2004, the Nordic private equity firm Altor Equity Partners acquired 
Dynapac but was during 2007 once again sold, now to the Atlas Copco Group 
(Berggren, 2008).  
 
Dynapac had sales in China through agents and distributors before the 80s. The sales 
were however very low. Dynapac formed a joint venture with a Chinese company in 
the 80s. They contributed with knowledge and products while the Chinese brought 
access and knowledge about the market. This partnership was ended after a few years 
and the Chinese company remains a competitor to Dynapac (Berggren, 2008).  
 
Berggren believes that since Dynapac has changed owners numerous times, their 
strategy for China has been disrupted and never had the opportunity to fully develop. 
During the Svedala ownership they had plans to establish themselves in China, plans 
that however never were realised. By the turn of the millennium and under Metso’s 
ownership, first sales channels were established and later in 2001 a production plant 
was located in China. It manufactured products for both Dynapac and Metso. 
Products that Dynapac previously had produced in Sweden were now produced in 
China though slightly modified in order suit the Chinese market. During the Altor 
years, they tried a partnership with a Chinese company. Dynapac wanted to gain 
access to of new sales channels and suppliers, in return the Chinese could use 
Dynapac’s brand. This partnership did not last since the Chinese actor was too small 
and the desired new volumes were not generated nor did Dynapac obtain new 
suppliers. With Atlas Copco as parent company, which has a tradition of acquiring 
companies at high rate - the possibility of acquisitions concerning Dynapac in China 
is not ruled out (Berggren, 2008). 
 
4.1.6 Höganäs 
Within Höganäs, the thesis authors have interviewed three representatives from the 
Höganäs China subsidiary: Per Engdahl, President; Peter Zhang, Sales Manager 
China; and Sidney Luk, Vice President.  
 
Höganäs is a world-leading supplier of metal powder. The company started in 1797 as 
a coal mining company. It later diversified to bricks and pottery during the 19th 
century. The company shifted focus to metals when the Höganäs Sponge Iron Process 
was introduced in 1910 and the first iron powder plant opened in 1945. Since then the 
business concept has been to develop, produce and market metal powder technology 
globally (Höganäs, 2008).  
 
Their largest customers are in the powder metallurgy, welding, chemical and 
metallurgical industries. The end products are usually consumed by the automotive 
industries and home appliances. According to Höganäs China President Per Engdahl, 
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by cooperating closely with the end customers’ development teams, Höganäs is 
working to outrival other forms of belaboured metals. 
 
Höganäs have production units in Belgium, India, Japan, China, USA, United 
Kingdom and Brazil. The group has about 1600 employees globally. The use of metal 
powders grows with about 5% annually, mainly because of substitution to metal 
powder technology from other forms of technology (Höganäs Annual Report 2007). 
 
Höganäs have been doing business in China for over 25-30 years. It was however not 
until the mid-90s that their first joint venture started in QingPu outside Shanghai. 
Today this subsidiary is wholly owned and is mainly focused on technical support and 
sales. The factory has some production as well, but mostly refinement of semi 
manufactured products made in Sweden or other production sites. The production 
cost is not much lower in China compared to other places in the world. Höganäs has 
also a sales office in the Guang Dong province (Engdahl, 2008).  
 
4.1.7 Sandvik 
The thesis authors interviewed Svante Lindholm, President of Sandvik China and 
former President of Sandvik Process System. 
 
Sandvik is a high-technology industrial engineering group with competences in 
materials technology focused around three core areas: 1) cemented carbide and high-
speed tools, 2) machinery, equipment and tools, 3) stainless and high-alloy steels, 
special metals, resistance materials and process systems. They have obtained a world 
leading position among certain segments and are represented in 130 countries. 
Sandvik develops, manufactures and market highly processed products that are 
supposed to contribute to enhanced productivity and profitability for the customers. 
The company has three main business areas; Tolling which provides cutting 
equipments to metalworking, Mining and Construction which provides excavation 
tools and equipment for mining sites, and Materials technology which supplies 
stainless and high-alloy steels and other forms of special metals or metal process 
systems for niche markets (Sandvik Annual Report 2007).  
 
Sandvik has sold products to China for more than 20 years, at first through agents. 
They opened their first representative office in 1985 and their first production site 
outside of Beijing in 1994. Sandvik China Holding was established in 2006 and is the 
legal parent company of all Sandvik subsidiaries in China. Today they have six 
factories, none of them can though be considered large. Sandvik is investing more and 
more in China, and want to lower the import of materials. Their primary growth 
should be organic, but mergers and acquisitions is however an option not to be ruled 
out. They are in the process of building five new factories of various capacities. In 
2007 Sandvik China had a turnover of about SEK 4 billion, representing about 4-5% 
of Sandvik’s total sales, and employed 1,400 people in 65 cities around China 
(Lindholm, 2008). 
 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 35 
4.1.8 SKF 
The thesis authors interviewed Magnus Johansson, President of SKF China 
Investments. 
 
SKF is one of the global leaders in supplying comprising rolling bearings, seals, 
mechatronics, and lubrication systems. Their business is divided in three Divisions: 
Industrial, Automotive and Service, each globally focusing on its specific customer 
segments. SKF has 110 manufacturing sites around the world and sales companies in 
70 countries. Totally, SKF is represented in more than 140 countries through more 
than 15,000 distributors and dealers (SKF Annual Report 2007). SKF has about 20% 
of the total world market (Johansson, 2008). 
 
SKF’s mission is to strengthen their global leadership and to remain profitable. In 
order to achieve long-term profitable growth SKF’s strategy includes for example 
keeping a clear and dedicated customer focus, focusing and investing in faster 
growing segments and regions, strengthening the product portfolio through investing 
in R&D and acquisitions, and attracting, retaining and developing the right personnel 
(SKF Annual Report 2007). 
 
SKF founded their first agency in China in 1912 and their first sales company in 
1916. A majority of the operations took place around Shanghai. Due to the political 
instability, SKF had to leave China in 1951. In 1986 they re-established business in 
China when they opened a consignment centre and in 1988 they established SKF 
China Ltd. in Hong Kong. After that SKF has opened representative offices in 
Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Dalian, Nanjing, Xian and Wuhan along 
with another consignment centre in Beijing. SKF has also focused on partnering with 
other major bearing producers, which has resulted in a vast expansion in China in the 
bearing business (SKF, 2008). 
 
Today, SKF has 18 sales offices and more than one hundred SKF-exclusive 
distributors in China. Out of ten production subsidiaries, three are still joint ventures 
but the rest are fully owned from which two of these started as joint ventures. Joint 
ventures are not actually preferred by SKF when acquiring new companies. SKF are 
cautious concerning branding aspects of their acquisitions, though their policy is to 
only have one brand – SKF. Only the latest acquisition in 2007 has not yet been 
rebranded. However, SKF China’s President Magnus Johansson claims that SKF’s 
primary growth is supposed to be organic and they have opened three own factories in 
2007. In the last 1.5 years, SKF has doubled its capacity in China with a total of 3,150 
employees. 
 
4.1.9 Tetra Pak 
The thesis interviewed two Tetra Pak employees: Lars Binder, Carton Economy R&D 
Manager, Development & Engineering, Tetra Pak China; and Gösta Seuranen, 
Manager Quality, Capital Equipment Supply Chain Operations, Tetra Pak China. 
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Tetra Pak is part of the Tetra Laval group. It was founded by Ruben Rausing in 1951 
and is still today privately owned. Tetra Pak’s business deals with food processing 
and packaging. The name stems from the first original package marketed which hade 
the shape of a tetrahedron (Tetra Pak, 2008a).  
 
Today Tetra Pak has operations in more than 150 markets and employs around 21,000 
persons worldwide. The company is market leader with an estimated 80% of the 
world ultra heat treatment (UHT) milk carton packaging market (Bloomberg, 2007) 
and has a very long-term view on investments. According Binder, the company’s 
long-term strategy is to package a large part of all unpackaged milk. A large part of 
the milk produced in world today is still not packaged, which in other words means 
needs to be consumed in a day or two. The milk market is Tetra Pak core business; 
however juices and other forms of noncarbonated liquids are of course business 
opportunities (Binder, 2008). 
 
Tetra Pak was one of the first Swedish companies to heavily invest in marketing 
activities in China after the civil war in the 40s. The company participated in 
agricultural fairs in communist China as early as 1972 and delivered its first filling 
machine in 1979 (Tetra Pak, 2008b). 
 
Tetra Pak has three factories producing packaging materials in China; the first one 
was established in 1987 in Fusan outside of Beijing (Tetra Pak, 2005). Tetra Pak have 
technical centre in Shanghai. Apart from offices in Shanghai, Beijing and Hong 
Kong, there are also sales offices in other major Chinese cities (Binder, 2008).  
 
4.2 Chinese market, today and tomorrow 
Great efforts have been put down to get fairly holistic views of the Chinese industrial 
market today (Luo, 2007; Hexter & Woetzel, 2007; Meyer, 2004). However any 
holistic view is not of any specific interest for the individual company. Every market 
has its own specific conditions, obstacles, customer segmentations or niches. This 
thesis acknowledges these factors and chooses to map each and every company’s 
market separately based on their own comments, so that general trends concerning 
competitors or customer behaviours can be perceived. Many of the benchmarked 
companies are often suppliers/customers or partners with each other; hence a strong 
connectivity exists between them, making it possible for this thesis to draw 
conclusions later.  
 
All of the interviewed managers had to answer questions about how their company 
perceived their own market situation and how they would describe their specific 
market. They are also asked to leave comments on whether they perceive any trends 
in their customers’ behaviours, trends in the markets and competitors. The 
interviewees were also questioned about each company’s past, current and future 
strategy in China (see Appendix - Questionnaire, page 78 for further detailed 
questions). 
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4.2.1 ABB Robotics 
ABB Robotics is a leading supplier of industrial robots, modular manufacturing 
systems and service. Brogren explains that ABB Robotics differentiates their business 
by providing the best products to the customers. Customers using and demanding 
industrial robots seek reliability in their manufacturing processes. Therefore there is 
no reason for wanting a good-enough robot; the customers simply want and need the 
best. ABB are consequently only focusing on the premium market, they believe that a 
market with lower quality products principally do not exist. There are smaller Chinese 
companies that are trying to enter the market but they are too small and do not have 
the proper technology yet. However, within ten years, some of these can become 
competitors (Brogren, 2008).  
 
China has become Asia’s third largest robot market and the sales grew by 23% in 
2006 (Litzenberger, 2007). ABB Robotics has a strong competitive position in the 
market for industrial robots, where there can basically only be premium robots. The 
inexpensive labour costs in China makes human labour represent the low-end 
products while principally all industrial robots represent premium products (Brogren, 
2008). 
 
4.2.2 Alfa Laval 
Alfa Laval has two factories and the headquarters for their China market company in 
the Yangtze River Delta region. For Alfa Laval, the sales process starts with 
cooperation with building consultants, contractors or other forms of system builders 
helping them with specifications for projects by promoting existing products to them. 
The equipment is then sold to the system builder who in turn sells a complete system 
or building with Alfa Laval equipment to the end user (Berg, 2008; Karlsson, 2008).  
 
According to product managers at Alfa Laval (Berg, 2008; Frennfelt, 2008; Karlsson, 
2008; Saleh, 2008), the Chinese CHE market is viewed as a triangle, with themselves 
and two or three Western MNCs at the top, the premium segment which is large in 
value but small in volumes. Most of the sold CHEs are for specialised applications 
within the industry or for prestigious building projects. But for Alfa Laval even their 
commodity products are in the premium segment.  
 
Beneath is the good-enough market with mostly small or medium sized Chinese 
competitors. These companies started with the simpler and smaller kinds of heat 
exchangers unfit for extreme conditions and with quite low quality. These 
manufacturers often start by copying existing products from the product ranges of 
Alfa Laval or its Western competitors. And with time and gained experience, these 
companies become better of selling and marketing their products, as well as better in 
developing new models. They are making more and more advanced models of CHEs 
(Saleh, 2008).  
 
The low-end market consists of heat exchanger manufacturers that are not even using 
plates but a technology called shell and tube. Most of these factories are nothing more 
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than small sheds. This is not an area that is of any interest for Alfa Laval or any other 
Western competitors (Saleh, 2008). 
 
The regional product manager at Alfa Laval, Saleh, believes that the good-enough 
market will grow at the expanse of both the low end and the premium markets. Even 
though not everybody in Alfa Laval agrees on this trend, the market is definitely 
shifting. According to the local sales managers, there are several reasons behind this 
development. In some cases they believe it is a temporary trend, such as when 
customers in the food business switch to cheaper equipment with non-hygienically 
parts (Ye, 2008). Some customers started out copying entire systems from Western 
companies; they bought all the equipment as it said in the specifications. However 
with time, they learned which parts that is critical and which parts that can be 
switched to generic products (Lee, 2008). Some customers are not interested in 
products compliant with a number of Western standards and specifications, when 
there are no laws and regulations for these kinds of products in China. Other 
customers, local system builders, are simply not interested in buying CHEs that are 
built to last and operate under extreme conditions for at least 20 years when their 
contract or guaranties for the delivered product is in most cases less than 5 years 
(Saleh, 2008). The system builders are never the end users and hence never interested 
in delivering the best products; just the best possible product with regards to their 
own profits. Tommy Li, the Chinese sales manager for the CHROME- and EFU3 
segments exemplifies: “Chinese families in the cities, switch residents every 5-10 
years. The families buy their own AC which is left in the apartment after moving. 
Hence few want to spend extra money on a premium AC that lasts more than 5-10 
years, so that the next tenant can use the AC as well”.  
 
Another reason for Alfa Laval to enter the good-enough market is to keep Chinese 
competitors away. By entering their home turf or market could be a tool for Alfa 
Laval hinder Chinese good-enough competitors from entering the premium market – 
Alfa Laval’s home market and area of expertise. Wilhelmsson refers to this as a 
containment policy after the Truman doctrine in 1947 concerning how to keep 
communism from spreading around the world. 
 
Sales managers in China are concerned that the premium price of Alfa Laval’s 
products is keeping smaller or medium sized customers with big growth potential 
away (Lee, 2008; Li, 2008; Zhou, 2008; Ye, 2008). If entering the good-enough 
market, Alfa Laval may bring the domestic customers up to the premium market 
when they in turn grow and become large international companies (Zhou, 2008). 
They believe that the market trends are shifting towards quality thinking and 
productivity. This means that the demand for premium products will grow with time 
(Ye, 2008; Zhou, 2008) or at least the premium and the good-enough segments will 
experience about the same growth rate (Li, 2008). However, Leon Lee, the sales 
                                                      
3 CHROME stands for Comfort, Heating, Refrigeration and OEM Equipment. EFU stands for 
Equipment Fluid Handling. These two segments use the simpler kind of CHEs and are often 
the sorts of markets that newcomers start with. Hence this is the most vulnerable segments 
because of the commodity nature of the products. 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 39 
manager for fluid utilities is concerned that the demand for Chinese good-enough 
industrial products is spreading to other emerging markets making the global good-
enough market to grow at a faster pace than the premium market. Tommy Li are 
worried that the gap between Chinese good-enough products and Western premium 
products are reducing so fast, that it might be no differences within 3-5 years. 
 
The Chinese competitors are getting better in both design and quality of their products 
and they are doing this at a lower cost. Generally these smaller companies are much 
cheaper and have substantially lower overheads. Their R&D costs are lower since 
they can afford to copy a great deal from Western CHE-producers (Ye, 2008), they 
are usually only strong regionally (Lee, 2008) and have a lot better local market 
knowledge than the MNCs (Li, 2008). They are also more flexible when it comes to 
customer needs and adaptations, but most importantly response-time at after service; 
since it is cheaper for them to send a local engineer to a nearby customer than for Alfa 
Laval to send a service man from Shanghai to some remote part of the countryside. 
The materials used in these good-enough products are low end, the packaging, the 
logistics, the functionality and testing are also just basic. These companies do not 
need to care about having a high standards when it comes to corporate social 
responsibility, environmental issues, social benefits for their workers and health and 
safety regulations at their factories, all of which contributes to their low overheads 
(Lee, 2008; Ye, 2008). 
 
4.2.3 ASSA ABLOY 
ASSA ABLOY is a very divisionally strong company, with a pronounced growth 
strategy through acquisitions. The company has adopted the concept of multiple 
branding in most of its markets. Officially there are six global and independent brands 
in which the brand ASSA ABLOY is nowhere mentioned in the name, they are Yale, 
Abloy, HID, Besam, Vingcard and Mul-T-Lock. These brands are all market leaders 
in their respective segments globally and have different security classes. Besides 
these brands, ASSA ABLOY owns numerous smaller, locally very strong brands in 
which after their names, ASSA ABLOY are always mentioned, as to give a quality 
mark. There are efforts to rationalise and decrease the number of brands and thus 
strengthen the remaining brands (Södergren, 2008). 
 
In China ASSA ABLOY have acquired three local brands: Guli, who came as a part 
of the Yale-acquisition, Baodean which is focused on OEM-projects and Wang Li 
who are market leaders in high-security domestic locks. The brands are produced 
under local brand for the local market. However, Guli serves both the Chinese 
domestic market under the own brands Guli and Yale, as well as being a low cost 
production unit for other ASSA ABLOY brands globally. Today ASSA ABLOY is 
still quite small in the Chinese market compared to the 10% market share they enjoy 
worldwide. The goal is reach about the same market share in China as well, mostly 
through growth by acquisition, but also organic growth (Södergren, 2008).  
 
The Chinese market for different locks is today 2 billion locks per year and growing. 
There are about 2,000 different actors on the market, mostly local companies 
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manufacturing non-standard compliant locks since there is not a generally accepted 
standard in China. The market is quite fragmented and extremely price sensitive. 
Local companies dominate the market since few international players yet have 
managed to significantly penetrate the low cost mass market according to Södergren. 
One of the reasons is that many of the products introduced in China are copied, so it 
is hard for the MNCs to differentiate themselves and have a sufficient return of their 
investments unless the production is local. Many products made in China are hence 
not very different from the global products.  
 
The market is instead segmented after standards, the top segment consists of locks 
compliant with the American standards and usually also sold under American brands. 
The next segment is the European Standard locks under European brands, which can 
be described as a middle segment. Then there is the Chinese standard compliant locks 
which makes up for some sort of higher low end market. ASSA ABLOY has products 
in all these three segments. In the bottom are the local producer’s non-standard locks, 
see Figure 7 (Södergren, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 7: ASSA ABLOY’s Chinese market segmentation. Source: Södergren, 2008 
 
4.2.4 Danfoss 
Employing about 2,500 people and having a turnover in China of about RMB 2 
billion is not enough according to Danfoss’ CEO Clausen. Together with 
management consulting firm McKinsey & Company, Danfoss has developed what 
they call a Supergrowth-strategy, which has been implemented. Danfoss’ objective is 
to become number one or two globally in their industry. This meaning global markets 
share of 20-40%. Today they are however the fifth largest company in their business. 
Danfoss wants to make China their second home market. 
 
According to Danfoss Vice President Jessen, Danfoss perceives the market as a 
sandglass consisting of two markets; the international standard market and the good-
enough market. In 2004, the good-enough market comprised 35% of the total market 
but today it is about 50% (see Figure 8). He points out that the good-enough market is 
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not static as its conditions shift, since 2004 more features have been added to good-
enough products.  
 
Figure 8: Danfoss' Chinese market perception. Source: Jessen, 2008 
Danfoss is generally only selling through distributors. Within the international 
standard market it happens that products are sold through OEM-channels, but these 
are never Danfoss-branded products. On this market, which cannot be considered as 
flexible, Danfoss offers global service and they never take any risks in terms of 
product reliability. Good-enough market companies are however much more flexible 
when it comes to market needs, deliveries, pricing, payment terms, engineering 
alterations, customisations, and technology. To offer service is also more expensive in 
Western countries than it is in countries such as China (Jessen, 2008). 
 
Jessen expects the Chinese to be the new Japanese, which entered the global market 
in the 70s with inexpensive products of not the best quality. Despite this, today many 
Japanese companies enjoy great success and Jessen predicts that the same will happen 
with the Chinese. He also believes that the Chinese good-enough products will spread 
internationally. Countries like India and Russia are already today highly interesting 
since low price is crucial and service is inexpensive to offer (Jessen, 2008). 
 
With their Chinese acquisitions, Danfoss are administrating a concept of second 
brands, most often the local company’s brand. Danfoss secures the quality of the local 
products through for example an inspector or a new department. Nevertheless, they 
want to keep old suppliers and distribution channels. But in the case of electronic 
components, Danfoss has sometimes interfered since they have larger volumes and 
can get better offers from suppliers. Danfoss’ acquisitions in China run their own 
R&D operations and have managed to keep their low costs by not implementing 
expensive Western routines such as project management processes, check lists, best 
practice tests, and IT-systems. The companies can thereby keep their time-to-market 
short. Danfoss has no or a minimum number of expats working for the acquired 
companies and the factories look just like other Chinese factories. Danfoss also wants 
to keep the original entrepreneur within the management so he/she can take advantage 
of Danfoss’ financial resources. Clausen describes the relationship as symmetric; 
Danfoss has the needed capital and scale, while the Chinese companies have the local 
knowledge and products.  
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Most Chinese companies are selling products on their low price while Danfoss and 
other foreign MNCs differentiate themselves on both quality and reputation. By 
selling products under Chinese brands, Clausen claims that Danfoss can sell them 
based on low price but with a higher quality than other Chinese companies’ products.  
 
An example of Danfoss’ Chinese acquisitions is Holip, a major player on the Chinese 
market for low cost frequency converters. This is also Danfoss’ first acquisition in 
line with its Chinese growth ambition. Holip has around 300 employees, among them 
only two Danes; one within sourcing as well as the President, however they have kept 
Holip’s founder and entrepreneur as the General Manager. Holip’s goal is to keep 
growing on the Chinese market without any real operational interference from 
Danfoss. Holip and Danfoss are treated as two separate organisations with different 
products focused towards different customers (Jessen, 2008).  
 
Holip is satisfied with the Danfoss take-over. Holip’s brand image has been improved 
with Danfoss as parent company, Danfoss’ superior technology has fixed some 
quality issues, they can purchase material cheaper today, and since Holip has to relive 
Danfoss’ core values, the working conditions has also been improved (Lu, 2008). 
Nevertheless, Jessen emphasises that the total cost structure between the two 
companies is completely different. Good-enough companies’ overhead costs are 
much lower; rent, salaries, travels, automation, and research are all examples of what 
is cheaper for the Chinese than for Danfoss. Jessen summarises the Holip case with 
“Big volume and Chinese behaviour makes us very, very strong!” 
 
4.2.5 Dynapac 
According to Berggren, Atlas Copco and Dynapac are very cautious concerning 
Dynapac’s brand. Their ambition is to obtain as high local market share as globally – 
approximately 20%. The market shares in China for asphalt rollers are around 5-10% 
while they barely have any sales of soil compactors at all. At first they strive to 
stabilise their position before venturing on. Dynapac’s parent company Atlas Copco 
is currently in a strong investing phase and Dynapac is expected to grow both organic 
and through acquisitions, which could both be global and local Chinese competitors. 
 
Berggren describes the compaction and paving equipment market as quite stagnant. It 
is strongly regulated by national authorities and global standards do not exist, every 
country has its own norms and requirements. China is not adopting Western research 
rapidly enough to suit Dynapac’s interests. The regulations in China are based on the 
actual weight of the equipment and not on the effective output, and Dynapac’s 
technology enables greater output for less weight. These regulations can almost be 
seen as trade barriers. Berggren also claims that there are few companies in their 
industry who actually are running profitable businesses in China. It is hard to obtain 
high volumes, which is essential if you want to use local suppliers to source from. 
Dynapac has to import material and components for their production in China. 
Berggren also admits that it can exist a mental block at the headquarters in Sweden 
that focus too much on ergonomics, quality and features. 
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Five years ago, Dynapac perceived the Chinese market as divided into premium and 
low-end products. About 10% of the volumes were premium products but Dynapac 
forecasted that the premium market would grow to 50% since the Chinese 
government were about to do major investments in infrastructure such as road 
constructions. In spite of this, the premium market did not grow. The market is 
unaffected and Berggren believes that it is necessary to enter the lower quality market 
in order to achieve high enough volumes so they can attract local suppliers to source 
from. However, he still believes that the market evolvement generally is towards 
higher quality. 
 
4.2.6 Höganäs 
The metal powder industry is considered as quite stagnant according to Engdahl, and 
Höganäs is therefore working with timeframes of 3-5 years in advance. Asia is 
Höganäs’ third largest market which makes it interesting. They see the market 
according to Khanna & Palepu’s (2006) segmentation of global with products that is 
the same everywhere, glocal with certain local adjustments of the products, and local 
with only locally produced products of poor quality (see Figure 5, page 23). Höganäs 
is not operating in the local market at all (Engdahl, 2008; Zhang, 2008). 
 
In terms of volume, the glocal market is increasing more rapidly than the global and 
is doing this on the global and local markets’ expense. However, in the long run, 
Höganäs believes that global will increase the most. According to Engdahl there are 
mainly three reasons why Höganäs should target the glocal, or good-enough, market: 
 
1. Many customers are considered to eventually change from glocal to global 
products. By operating in the glocal market, Höganäs can establish customer 
relationship at an early stage, and hence be the company that brings the 
customer up into the global market instead of letting a local company do so. 
2. A defensive strategy: Entering the glocal market is a tool to avoid 
confrontation with domestic competitors in the global market at a later stage. 
You move the frontline downwards in the segmentation pyramid (see Figure 
5, page 23). 
3. The glocal market is a very large market and Höganäs wants to increase their 
production volumes. In basic industries, as in Höganäs case, Engdahl points 
out the importance of high volumes in order to keep the costs low. 
 
According to Zhang, Höganäs has quite good overview of their Chinese competitors. 
These seek contact with Höganäs in order to obtain technology and Western 
management skills. Höganäs is continually having a discussion with the competitors 
and have a fairly good perception of how they are working with procurement and 
management. Chinese companies are using what Engdahl refers to as a capacity-
based strategy. They focus on volume and want to increase their production capacity 
through the purchase of new equipment. However, they still lack the proper 
technology knowledge and out of the 40 local competitors today, Engdahl only 
believes that four or five will pertain in the long run. 
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Höganäs consider themselves better than their Chinese competitors when it comes to 
quality, logistics, service and support. Therefore, they believe that they can compete 
against local companies with this instead of pricing, and can hence contribute to the 
customers’ development. But since the customers are demanding less expensive 
products, Höganäs feels that they must produce products with somewhat poorer 
specifications. To lower the price, Höganäs can cut the products’ performance, hence 
the poorer specifications. Quality for Engdahl includes access to service, delivery 
reliability, and value adding outcome for the customers. These are features that 
Höganäs will not finger on since it enables an extra 10% margin. Engdahl highlights 
the importance of the right mixture of pricing and quality in every market niche. Each 
product should only be marketed towards specific niches and have an explicit 
requirements profile of specifications in order to carry out the precise marketing 
operations.  
 
Another action in order to lower the price is sourcing material locally. It is not 
cheaper to buy material in China compared to other places, but Höganäs’ major 
accumulation of capital lies in the logistics. So they want to lower their transportation 
costs. The long-term goal is to control more of the value chain (Engdahl, 2008).  
 
Höganäs must understand where the strategic decisions are made in the customers’ 
organisations. An example is the automotive industry where much production is 
located in China but the development and the decisions are made in Japan or Europe 
(Engdahl, 2008). 
 
According to Engdahl, Höganäs will probably keep the Höganäs brand on the glocal 
products. The products will probably have different subordinate model names, like 
Nokia’s mobile phones, which have different features and scopes of use. Dependent 
of the performance of Höganäs’ products, they will be included in different 
subordinate groups and model names.  
 
4.2.7 Sandvik 
From Sandvik’s and Lindholm’s point of view, the Chinese market consists of a high-
end market and low-end market that are distinctly separate by ISO standards. In the 
low-end of the market there are only domestic producers; while in the high-end there 
are only Western and Japanese companies. Sandvik is and will always remain only in 
the high-end markets because the company is very engineering focused. According 
Lindholm, Sandvik is not competing with its actual products but the productivity that 
the products generate for the customers.  
 
Within Mining and construction, the Chinese mining companies are focused on 
conducting even more large-scale mining operations and are therefore asking for 
more advanced heavy and automated machinery (Lindholm, 2008).  
 
In the Tooling market, Sandvik is experiencing a clear increase in demand for high-
end tools. According to Lindholm, there is no sense of doing a good-enough 
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metalworking tool, it is either low-end and then the tools will have to be replaced 
often or it is high-end which means it will last as long as current technology permits. 
The general market trend is an increased focus on productivity, which was unheard of 
just five years ago. Lindholm speculates that the urge or need of improving product 
quality have forced a lot of Chinese manufacturers to invest in expensive and new 
machine parks. In order to regain the investments as fast as possible, the machines 
need to run around-the-clock and not be stopped by frequent tool replacements, hence 
the demand for high-end tooling will clearly increase even more with time.  
 
As for Materials Technology, Sandvik is offering such niched products in the big 
steel market, which means the niche only contains high-end products and customers 
(Lindholm, 2008).  
 
Although today, none of the Chinese producers can truly be regarded by Sandvik as 
competitors, Lindholm is aware of a few companies moving upwards in quality. He 
also mentions that in the past, the Chinese companies were only interested in 
cooperation in order to gain new technology and to do exports to the West. Today 
however many of these companies are becoming more like Western companies, they 
have competent management and lots of capital to invest with. So he is expecting 
them in the high-end market in the perceivable future.  
 
4.2.8 SKF 
SKF China President Johansson emphasises that SKF consider China as a major 
market and not a country for low-cost production. Among their so called target 
customers, SKF has an equally strong position as globally. 8% of SKF’s total sales 
are generated in China. However, SKF can only locally produce a forth of their total 
sales in China. During the past 1.5 years, SKF has doubled their capacity in China. 
SKF’s primary growth is supposed to be organic and they have opened three own 
factories in 2007. Acquisitions made due to strategic issues such as market position, 
distribution channels, and products of the acquired companies. Their products have 
been complementary to SKF’s existing range. 
 
Several companies develop for the low-end market as the global competition 
increases. However, the low-end market is not a target for SKF since they are a 
pronounced premium company and wants to remain so. The challenge is to reach out 
to a wider market (Johansson, 2008). 
 
The SKF strategy is clear and quality remains as the key dimension and they do not 
have a special China-range of products either. The Chinese local competitors produce 
commodity products – small bearings sold inexpensively to high volume customers. 
In contrast to SKF’s business where high technology content and long product life 
span is a prerequisite, these low-end bearings remains functional for a more limited 
time. The Chinese companies are however moving upwards in their performance and 
also further forward in the value chain. Their products have also started to spread 
globally (Johansson, 2008). 
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Johansson claims that doing business with SKF implicates a certain sense of safety. 
But the needed price differentiation in China generates a new way of doing business 
for SKF.  
 
4.2.9 Tetra Pak 
Tetra Pak has a dominant position globally and in China (Tse & Haddock, 2005; 
Seuranen, 2008). They have chosen to grow organically and not through acquisitions. 
One reason is that Tetra Pak has a policy of always wholly own the subsidiary and 
another reason is the decision of gradually moving more equipment manufacturing to 
China to reduce cost and have local presence on the market (Seuranen, 2008). The 
strategy is to gradually source material locally in China. By purchasing within China, 
the company saves both transportation and toll costs and benefits from cutting a piece 
of local manufacturers’ large volumes on commodity or standard products. Tetra Pak 
is also aware that most of their original suppliers have manufacturing in China today, 
so by purchasing from them within China, Tetra Pak aim to lower their material costs 
and also get to buy all their materials in local currency or currency linked to USD. 
Today Tetra Pak would like to balance their currency fluctuations by procurement 
and sales in the same currency. (Binder, 2008; Seuranen, 2008). 
 
Tetra Pak segments offerings into different value adding attributes globally and in 
China. There is a growing market for premium packaging that is made with more 
exclusive materials. The idea is to package exclusive juices or give-away milk 
products. For most value for money and convenience, there is the Carton Value 
segment, the kind that is used in most OECD countries – thick brick-shaped paper 
cartons. Tetra Pak has the Carton Economy range that offers a low-cost carton design 
and thinner packaging, an example are the thin fibre-based Tetra Fino Aseptic 
(cushion shaped) milk packages found in Southeast Asia and in other low GDP 
countries. Carton Bottle which offers the premium segment products with reclose 
ability (screw cap, bottle like) is not yet a large seller in China (Binder, 2008). 
 
Tetra Pak sold about 25 billion packages in China last year. About 20% was Carton 
Economy packaging and the rest was almost solely Carton Value. A large portion of 
the Carton Economy packages are sold to China and this segment is expected to grow 
in both China and the rest of Southeast Asia. By the end of 2009, the goal is that a 
large portion of packaging and distribution machines for Carton Economy will be 
made in China, with specifications for the global market. However, the R&D manager 
for Carton Economy machines, Binder, says that the global/Chinese specifications are 
going to be hard to meet.  
 
Since the last quarter of 2007, the price of milk has increased by 50% on the market 
and the price is climbing steadily. This has meant an unfortunate decline of sales in 
the Carton Economy segment but a rise of sales in the premium segment. Binder 
gives the following calculation example: 
 
“If regular white milk packages in Carton Economy or Carton Value cost around 
RMB 10-14, the milk packaged in exclusive cases with little windows on the side will 
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cost between RMB 28-20. This means that the dairy industry is trying to make up for 
profit losses by promoting the more expensive kind of milk. Like when we go to a 
party with a bottle of wine, the Chinese arrive to a party with a gift package of milk. 
The usual profit margin for regular milk is 5% compared to the 100% profit margin 
of enriched milk like drinkable yoghurt.”  
 
4.3 R&D in China 
The benchmarked companies’ current R&D activities were studied in this research. 
The interviewees answered questions regarding what kind of R&D activities that are 
established in China, their mission and what their future plans are.  
 
4.3.1 ABB Robotics 
According to Brogren, ABB Robotics has for a long time had an engineering centre in 
China. They worked with delivery, installations and general service – providing 
system solutions for the customers. Three years ago ABB Robotics started what they 
call an R&D unit in Shanghai. The unit has three responsibilities: First, to support the 
production unit at the same location. Second, to support and help the low-cost 
sourcing unit in China by helping to redesign for new materials. Thirdly and most 
importantly, to make all China-specific adaptations. 60% of the unit’s work consists 
of redesigning for Chinese market requirements and customer specific needs.  
 
Brogren emphasises that all basic research is today conducted in Västerås and will 
remain there also in the future. The R&D unit in China is to support the Chinese 
market, they do not have any saying in which products to make, but they decide on 
how to make a chosen product.  
 
4.3.2 Alfa Laval 
The company is right now starting a development unit at their Chinese headquarters 
in Shanghai. A Danish manager is appointed, and on site the idea is to employ four 
persons within six months. The team’s mission is currently to redesign the CHE 
frames for locally sourced materials but that mission can be subject to change 
depending on whether the general management decides to invest in a China adapted 
product range or not (Frennfeldt, 2008; Wilhelmsson, 2008).  
 
There are several reasons for situating the development unit in the Shanghai centre. 
Alfa Laval hopes it will make it easier to find suitable candidates for the unit. They 
want the unit to be of support to the production, but not buried by work from the 
production. By situating them next to the sales force, Alfa Laval hopes that the unit 
will become more market perceptive and adapt market changes to the product faster 
(Wilhelmsson, 2008).  
 
4.3.3 ASSA ABLOY 
ASSA ABLOY’s Asia Pacific division has an R&D lead-office in Australia. They 
develop products for their Australian factories and also for Guli. Guli and the other 
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subsidiaries have also their own development resources. At the moment, ASSA 
ABLOY are having discussions on whether they should create R&D competence 
centres that could serve more than one brand (Södergren, 2008). 
 
There are about 100 people working within R&D in the entire Asia Pacific division. 
About half of these are located in China, distributed over three factories. Every 
factory has their own development group working 50% on production adjustments 
and 50% with product development, including incremental development. The groups’ 
performances are not measured specifically. However, the corporate group keep 
statistics over contribution marginal, how much costs are lowered and profits 
increased, and how much of the sales that are generated by products launched during 
the last three years. Södergren highlights the success factor of reaching a critical mass 
– volume – not only in the production but also in R&D resources. 
 
The Chinese factories are working with fairly close collaboration with the market and 
have high autonomy. They are working according to ASSA ABLOY’s standardised 
gateway-process. In order to keep a close contact with the market and manage the 
local factories in the most efficient way, ASSA ABLOY has chosen to keep many 
locals in the management teams (Södergren, 2008). 
 
4.3.4 Danfoss 
When Danfoss was looking for an acquisition candidate, which in 2005 resulted in 
Holip, they were at the same time starting an R&D group in order to rapidly access 
the good-enough market. The group started to work in October 2004 with four Danish 
engineers in Denmark and they later brought five Chinese engineers to Denmark. The 
group was after a few months relocated to Beijing. Today there are 25 engineers and 
the Danish engineers have gradually returned to Denmark (Jessen, 2008).  
 
Danfoss wanted production in China and did not believe it was possible without 
adjacent R&D operations, which would also result in better sourcing. The R&D group 
was supposed to develop, based on Chinese requirements, a “lean”, or good-enough 
products for the lower premium/upper good-enough market, and is today sold 
globally. The R&D units in Danfoss and Holip are kept separate, but they have on one 
occasion helped Holip by providing them with a Danfoss lean product for Holip to 
further downgrade. This downgraded product is sold by Holip, not only in China, but 
is actually being shipped to other emerging countries such as Pakistan (Jessen, 2008).  
 
Jessen claims that Danfoss has no plans to establish full-scale R&D operations in 
China. However, when it comes to local products, the decisions are made locally but 
for global products the decisions are made centrally in Denmark. Jessen also 
emphasises that they have not focused on the cost per R&D-hour in China, a major 
advantage is that Chinese engineers enables better opportunities for local sourcing, 
which drives Danfoss’ Chinese expansion. 
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4.3.5 Dynapac 
The company has about 60 people in three R&D units around the globe. They have 
three persons in a unit at their factory outside Beijing. Berggren prefers to call it a 
development unit since it is strongly linked with the production and the idea is to act 
as some sort of back-office or physical link between the R&D in Sweden and 
production in China. The development unit is only little over a year old and is not yet 
fully in operation and right now they are only dealing with production maintenance. 
However the idea is that in the future to also act as a resource to the main R&D 
(Berggren, 2008).  
 
4.3.6 Höganäs 
Höganäs has a tech-centre at their production site that serves the entire Asian market. 
This is one of three Höganäs tech-centres in the world. Their objective is to aid 
customers and production with troubleshooting. In China it acts as technical support 
that brings the company closer to the customers and the market. They do some slight 
customer adjustments. They also offer educational seminars for customers. Doing 
more development in the future is however not excluded. Engdahl says that Höganäs 
is not large enough as a company in order to have multiple R&D centres. An 
innovative environment requires a critical mass and hence the reason to keep R&D in 
Sweden.  
 
The Chinese tech-centre is managed by the production manager and consists of 
further nine people, all with engineering degrees. The Asian region is working with 
fairly high autonomy with not much interference from the headquarters in Sweden. 
The working routines are the same at all three tech-centres and they work with a 
common database (Engdahl, 2008). 
 
4.3.7 Sandvik 
Sandvik are today not conducting any research in China nor do they intend to start a 
full-scale R&D centre in China. They do however have a special tooling site where 
Sandvik designs specially adapted metalworking tools after customer preferences and 
a tech-centre in Shanghai with about ten engineers that together with customers 
develop product solutions for specific problems (Lindholm, 2008).  
 
4.3.8 SKF 
SKF pursues product development in China. They do adjustments on existing 
products in order to suit the market. These are often project-specific for different 
sectors of application. Their factories deal with various kinds of businesses and 
carries out certain adjustments. Additionally, SKF has four service centres in China 
that function as support to the sales teams engaged with customers. Minor 
adjustments are resolved locally in China but when it matters product performance, 
the decisions are made centrally (Johansson, 2008). 
 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 50
4.3.9 Tetra Pak 
In 2006, Binder started looking for engineers for a full-scale R&D unit in China. 
Today they are eleven Chinese engineers, two Swedish managers and a Swedish 
engineer and they are still looking for a couple more to fill the group and to reach 
what Binder calls a critical mass. It means that if one person choose to quit, it won’t 
affect the productivity of the group and a new team member can be trained by the 
group themselves instead of needing to send the person to Sweden for training.  
 
Regardless, Binder still emphasises on sending new recruits to the central R&D in 
Lund. This is because they need to form networks, contacts and get a sense of the 
original Tetra Pak spirit. The Chinese R&D, operations and market unit can submit 
desired projects and tasks into a master list, which the central R&D in Lund will 
redistribute among all the R&D sites globally. This means that this local development 
unit work with other projects than only China-specific and that all their work need to 
be approved by the engineers in Lund (Binder, 2008). 
 
The main projects today for the development unit are to support and ramp up 
production of distribution machines in China. They will also support Supply Chain 
and Operations to adapt filling machines for local production. But they are not to 
develop key technology for filling machines since this is Tetra Pak’s core technology. 
The unit will most likely be responsible for product lifecycle maintenance for the 
Chinese produced machines. However, the general management at Tetra Pak has not 
confirmed a long-term goal for the development unit, they are according to Binder: 
“Let’s start and see how where it goes”. For Tetra Pak this development unit also has 
a PR-value. It sends strong commitment signals to the market that they are investing 
in development in the market and they hope to have a shorter response time to 
shifting market needs (Binder, 2008). 
 
4.4 Observed difficulties and other issues 
In this section, the thesis authors would like to highlight some other issues when it 
comes to the participating companies’ situations in the Chinese market. It can concern 
general obstacles or interesting lessons learned. However, not all the participating 
companies chose to comment or elaborate around these issues, or they simply have 
not perceived any unusual difficulties. 
 
4.4.1 Alfa Laval 
Alfa Laval has experienced that their current commodity CHEs have too superior 
specifications for a large part of the Chinese market. A single product often ranges 
over a too big share of its market sector of application. There are therefore 
opportunities to differentiate products towards particular market needs instead. 
Chinese competitors are better at this and they design their products with less safety 
marginal and with fewer components which enables them to have a shorter time-to-
market and, above all, a lower cost (Saleh, 2008). 
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When looking at Chinese acquisition candidates, Alfa Laval has encountered that the 
ownership structure is often quite diffuse and that the government often owns a small 
share of the company. This makes it harder to complete an eventual acquisition 
(Saleh, 2008). Several previous external studies (Cooke, 2006; Tse, 2006; Fugazy, 
2007) concur on this aspect. 
 
Alfa Laval faces the issue if they should target the good-enough market, and of how 
to target it. They face major issues concerning how to not harm their premium status 
while entering a new lower quality segment, and how these products should be 
distributed, marketed and sold (Wilhelmsson, 2008). 
 
4.4.2 Danfoss 
Danfoss CEO Clausen emphasised a great deal on the importance of soft issues. Soft 
issues such as incorporating corporate values like respect for other cultures, care for 
employees, good food at the factory cantinas, flat hierarchy when it comes to 
relationships between manger and worker; these issues cost little to introduce, but the 
returns are huge especially in enhancing the corporate entrepreneurship in the 
company.  
 
When it comes to acquiring a Chinese good-enough company, it is crucial not to do 
too much integration. The acquired company need only the most basic make over to 
fit the parent company’s corporate standard in corporate social responsibilities issues 
and in financial reporting; otherwise it could be hard to keep the companies separated. 
Jessen also notes that integration mean rise of overheads. The parent company should 
not make too many changes in processes and management in the acquired company. 
That will only make the employees worried and extensive processes are just 
expensive habits (Jessen, 2008).  
 
For Jessen, the biggest challenge is how to conduct and coordinate global R&D 
activities in the most efficient way. How should practical issue such as knowledge 
transfer and IT-access be handled? It requires two different cultures when managing 
an international standard market company like Danfoss or managing a good-enough 
market company such as Holip. However, there need to be some sort of knowledge 
transfer so that Holip management can benefit from best practices within Danfoss 
(Jessen, 2008).  
 
4.4.3 Dynapac 
Berggren claims that Dynapac’s development unit in China is not functioning 
effectively yet, and he thinks it is still a long way before it will do so. Today, there are 
not any clear objectives to work towards. Dynapac has listened to its Hong Kong 
subsidiary and previous owners before venturing on in China; hence the information 
has been obtained internally. 
 
When recruiting to the development unit, Dynapac has had requirements of 
engineering exams, previous design experience of heavy construction equipment, and 
English bespoken. Dynapac have experienced three major obstacles concerning the 
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employees: First, it is hard to find people with proper English speaking skills. 
Secondly, the applicants often do not live up to the expectations nor what their CVs 
claim. Thirdly, few Chinese take initiatives and make their way (Berggren, 2008). 
 
4.4.4 Höganäs 
Since Höganäs China is a bit further back in the product life cycle compared to 
Sweden, the organisation is more characterised by a dynamic and entrepreneurial 
environment. Everything is run at a faster pace and the people are more impatient, 
which demands special considerations in terms of human resource issues. Höganäs is 
experiencing problems finding the right personnel. They seek English-speaking 
engineers with proper university education, but this is not the easiest task. Engdahl 
also distinguishes three other problems: 1) Retaining of personnel, especially within 
sales, 2) Communication issues concerning different cultures and languages between 
China and Sweden, and 3) Having the Swedish management style to work 
successfully, it is new for the Chinese. Engdahl finds it important to discover key 
personnel and focus on retaining them by tailoring individual employment packages. 
If someone does not fit Höganäs way of work they should be discharged.  
 
According to Engdahl, most of the accessible data regarding Chinese market 
presumptions is not applicable and is more or less inaccurate. Up until two to three 
years ago, Höganäs acted poorly when it came to collecting relevant market data. 
Today however, they have continuous communications with stakeholders and 
competitors in order to collect up-to-date knowledge, which they continually test by 
consensus- and plausibility analyses.  
 
4.4.5 SKF 
Johansson claims that it is very easy for a foreigner to notice the differences between 
the home country’s culture and the Chinese. Instead, one should focus on the 
similarities and thereby find opportunities to endeavour from. When selecting people 
SKF would rather look for people with the right values and attitude and build the 
competencies. For instance, they have experienced slight problems with personnel 
whose English skills are not the best. But this has most often been outweighed by 
their personality and values. Given that SKF is a global company, Johansson 
highlights the importance of having Chinese employees working on international 
project since Chinese people generally do not have any international work experience. 
It is also important to educate the staff in teamwork because of their general lack of 
experience in this field.  
 
4.4.6 Tetra Pak 
Although personnel retention is not a big problem, Tetra Pak works very hard to 
retain their employees. They want people willing to give long-term commitments to 
the company, which is why a couple of years of work experience is most desirable, 
since new graduates usually like to try their wings in different companies at the start 
of their career (Seuranen, 2008). Tetra Pak would also like to have a mix of people 
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that reflects the society they are active in, hence the need of mixed ages (Binder, 
2008).  
 
The turnover rate in China is generally higher than what Tetra Pak experiences in 
other markets. Seuranen believes that there is more pressure in China for people to 
switch jobs, as to prove their competency and climbing the career ladder. 
 
Binder, who is soon moving to China to lead the development unit, wants to connect 
his employees to the brand and company Tetra Pak, rather than him as manager. He 
has observed that many times loyalty to the manager is stronger than to the company, 
so when he moves back to Sweden, the employees would like to remain at Tetra Pak.  
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5 Analysis 
The analysis is based upon the numerous interviews conducted during the research. It 
is structured to first examine the Uppsala internationalisation model’s validity 
concerning the benchmarked companies’ China establishment and analyse whether 
R&D is a natural next step. Secondly, the companies’ attitudes and actions 
concerning the good-enough market are analysed. Finally, we merge the Uppsala 
internationalisation model with the good-enough market theory and study how they 
are connected. 
 
5.1 The Uppsala model and the establishment chain - tested in 
China 
As mentioned earlier in the theoretical framework, the order and the speed of the 
establishment chain are of no consequence. However most of the benchmarking 
companies have an establishment history in China that is well consistent with the 
Uppsala internationalisation model’s establishment chain. When asked about their 
company’s history in China, most interviewees regarded the start of the Chinese 
establishment being the first joint venture made, usually sometime in the late 80s or 
early 90s.  
 
Since the start of the economical reforms in the late 70s, the gradual opening in the 
Chinese market has very much influenced the companies’ entry mode. All of the 
interviewed companies had some sales into the Chinese market before deciding to 
enter with a subsidiary. The sales were usually conducted through agents in China, or 
through their own sales offices in other countries in Southeast Asia which 
traditionally had channels into the otherwise closed China, such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore or Taiwan.  
 
The companies entering before 1993 more or less had to enter through forming joint 
ventures with Chinese companies. The Chinese counterpart provided the land, factory 
buildings, labour force and crucial market knowledge, while the MNC provided the 
technology. All of the interviewed companies chose to as soon as possible either to 
leave their first joint venture or to buy out the Chinese counterpart. The reasons stated 
varied from company policy being to always wholly own subsidiaries, to 
irreconcilable differences, and to the Chinese counterpart not being what they seemed  
to be from the beginning and thus the outcome of not being enough satisfied.  
 
On a quick glance, the development portrays that, in the case of China, the MNCs did 
not have the chance to enter with small and incremental steps as predicted by the 
establishment chain and the Uppsala model. It looks like the companies had to make 
large market commitments without sufficient experiential market knowledge. We 
agree that external factors like the Chinese government’s control over the market 
affects the order and time scope of the establishment chain, but not the pattern. The 
establishment chain can be said to have been followed by all the studied companies, 
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just in slightly different ways. They all first had sales sporadically into China, some 
before the communist take-over, others after. The daily sales were then mediated by 
agents and distributors or by the companies’ own sales offices outside mainland 
China, since establishment in China at that time was almost impossible. Sandvik and 
SKF established representative offices in China in the 80s to complement their sales 
offices in Hong Kong. Others (Tetra Pak, Höganäs, Dynapac and Alfa Laval) leaped 
in the 90s with opening production plants through joint ventures.  
 
The establishment chain reflects the incremental steps of an internationalisation based 
on the firm’s acquired market knowledge. Some market knowledge was acquired 
through sales offices outside China or by agents inside China. However, the 
experiential knowledge on the Chinese market was mostly weak. The commitment 
decision to enter China were based on current market knowledge at the time, which 
was small; and the psychic distance to the market was large, meaning that the 
companies must have viewed the Chinese market’s potential as very large, which 
indicates a larger tolerance of risk. The forming of a joint venture may reduce the 
financial risks taken since any profits or losses were shared. But more importantly a 
joint venture where the Chinese counterpart could provide all the required 
connections and the much-needed experiential knowledge which was besides being 
compulsory, also very much helpful. The entering company lacked the market 
knowledge required, and had to compensate with making a large market commitment.  
 
In the 80s the Chinese market was much less developed compared to the market in the 
90s. So when Sandvik and SKF entered in the 80s, representative offices meant little 
market commitment since the risk tolerance for the Chinese market was low at the 
time. The economical reforms had after all just started. In the 90s when the prognosis 
became clear, also these two companies formed joint ventures with leading local 
companies.  
 
Danfoss, which entered China in the mid 90s, had the chance to start with wholly 
owned subsidiaries. The company has had sales through distributors in China or 
through its sales office in Hong Kong. Since the late entry, the company already had 
strong sales into the Chinese market and hence started from the beginning with 
wholly owned production facilities. There were no long-term strategy behind the 
commitment; it was rather about taking the opportunity to gain cost benefits from the 
cheap labour costs in China. The strategy was simply not try too many difficult things 
at one time. They had already started with a big commitment decision with wholly 
owning the factory from the beginning, so the current activities of the firm were 
simply a replication of what they did in production facilities in Europe. When 
everything started up well, the next step in the cycle was to switch to local suppliers, 
which are a form of market commitment and required market knowledge, again since 
the operations were doing fine, Danfoss could afford a bit of risk.  Like this, Danfoss 
gained market knowledge and increased market commitment gradually. 
 
ASSA ABLOY is the latecomer in this troupe. They entered late since their Western 
competitors did not dare to enter the Chinese market. They followed a stringent 
acquisition strategy with multiple local brands, which enabled them to make large 
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financial commitments with little actual resource commitment to that market. Each 
Chinese locks company that is bought adds experiential market knowledge from the 
acquired company to ASSA ABLOY, making them better at targeting and acquiring 
the next company as well as coordinating procurement of materials.  
 
5.1.1 Developing R&D in China 
All of the studied companies have engineers working with product adaptations for the 
Chinese market. The China share of the total sales is ever increasing for these 
companies and with big sales comes customer modifications. The production facilities 
need engineers for production problems and maintenance. These engineers are also 
sometimes working on the product adaptations. In other cases there are engineers 
solely dedicated to product development. However, none of the studied companies 
have engineers working with core research. Only the ‘D’ in R&D is located in China. 
The ‘R’ representing research is left back home in the West. In spite of to what extent 
R&D is conducted in China, we refer to it as R&D activities.  
 
We interpret that establishing R&D activities step by step in a market, means to re-
evaluate ones current activities, and make the decision of increasing the R&D 
activities. Deciding to increase the R&D activities, is seen as commitment to that 
actual market. In other words, we see each form of establishment of R&D activities as 
a form of market commitment. Each new step of market commitment results in more 
market knowledge since the development becomes more specific to the particular 
market. With engineers committed to work towards the market, they naturally become 
nearer the market, hence the increased market knowledge.  
 
Having production facilities also results in having production engineers dealing with 
at least production maintenance at the factories. Alfa Laval and Dynapac have up 
until today had the least R&D activities of the studied companies; production 
engineers dealing with production maintenance, slight adjustments according to local 
production conditions, and functioning as the link between centralised R&D and the 
local production. Alfa Laval has, as already mentioned, started a new development 
unit that shall redesign the products for locally sourced materials. This is similar to 
SKF’s current R&D activities in their Chinese service centres that also pursues 
product development. They perform product development in the sense that they do 
adjustments of products as long as the products’ performance is not altered with.  
 
ABB Robotics has had for a long time an engineering centre providing customised 
system solutions and of course, service. Today they have what they choose to call an 
R&D unit, although it does not deal with actual research. ABB Robotics’ R&D unit 
supports the production and the low-cost sourcing function, and redesign products for 
Chinese market requirements and specific customer needs. It is quite similar to the 
case of Tetra Pak, where they are adapting machines for local production and 
conducting product lifecycle maintenance. This kind of R&D commitments is the 
result of a gradual shift of focus, from streamlining production operations to 
optimising procurement operations and stems from the current market activities of the 
company.  
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We can also distinguish a kind of R&D commitment being the kind of tech-centres 
that Höganäs and Sandvik have. They provide service through customer interactions, 
aiding customers in order to find the proper solutions suited for them. This also brings 
the company closer to the market and hence increases the market knowledge. 
Höganäs’ plans to enter the glocal/good-enough market from above, will therefore 
increase its local R&D commitment. 
 
The R&D activities taken place in China is correlated with the market knowledge. We 
see a trend of R&D activities being incorporated with a nearness to the market: from 
tech-centres as Höganäs and Sandvik, to ABB Robotic who locally provides system 
solutions, and Tetra Pak who adapts machines for local production. The decisions 
tend to be made locally as long as the actual product performance is not altered; those 
decisions are still made in the West. By having R&D activities locally incorporated 
with the market, the chance of seizing new market opportunities is increased 
 
The more R&D activities being transferred from a company’s original R&D 
activities, the risk-taking on the new market increases. The risks accumulate with the 
more parts of core technology knowledge that enters into a foreign industrial network. 
This means that the company is taking a bigger risk since its technology and 
resources become expanded over a larger area of contact in the new industrial 
network. In a country like China, this is especially a problem because of plagiarism 
being a major issue of concern here. We find that establishing R&D in a new market 
implies an enormous market commitment because once the technology has entered 
the market it will stay there. This explains why none of the benchmarked companies 
has established any true ‘R’ of their R&D activities in China. Nor are they planning 
to. 
 
The process of acquiring a good-enough market company follows similar steps of 
increasing market commitment, starting at evaluating its current activities. 
Concerning R&D, the acquiring company buys both the market knowledge and the 
R&D knowledge. This R&D knowledge can be product specific or network specific. 
With network specific, we mean the knowledge concerning good-enough suppliers, 
good-enough customer requirements, experiential knowledge of how to best package 
and treat the finished product for logistics and so on. This is a kind of experiential 
knowledge whereas product specific knowledge is transferable general knowledge.  
 
However, we believe that no matter if a MNC is interested in entering the good-
enough market by gradually learning this network specific knowledge or are buying 
the knowledge through acquisitions, the process should be incremental from the top to 
the bottom of the segment. If a premium company would acquire a company in the 
lower good-enough market as a first time venture into the good-enough market, the 
market knowledge would most likely not be sufficient. Nearness to the targeted 
market adds market knowledge since one would encounter the adjoining market more 
frequently than if the targeted market is further away. Acquired R&D activities is also 
incremental, hence the compay should not target acquisition candidates far down in 
the good-enough market because they lack the sufficient market knowledge of the 
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adjoining segments. If the acquired company‘s quality position is very far away from 
the company’s, the market in between them is still lost for both. Danfoss and ASSA 
ABLOY for example have both acquired top good-enough market leaders rather than 
targeting lower good-enough market leaders.  
 
Danfoss is the only studied company that has made use of both establishing own 
R&D as well as buying new R&D resources through the acquisition of a company in 
the good-enough segment. They started an R&D unit in Beijing developing a product 
for the lower international standard market. In the meantime they sought the Chinese 
market for a good-enough company to acquire and found Holip. With the knowledge 
gained by having their own “good-enough R&D unit”, they could jumpstart 
cooperation with Holip by supplying them with their lower high-end/ international 
standards product to strip further. The R&D in Holip does not follow the same 
procedures or timeframes as R&D in Danfoss; Holip focuses on the using their 
market knowledge in downgrading the product. Without too much of Western best 
practices, Holip can maintain their cost structure low. This in return gives Danfoss 
market knowledge of the present state and development of the good-enough market, 
making their lower high-end market R&D better. The case of Holip and Danfoss 
exemplifies that a large part of good-enough market can be reached, having taken two 
steps downwards simultaneously, in a short period of time by combining the two 
strategies.  
 
ASSA ABLOY is the company with most number of acquired local brands among our 
benchmarking companies. The acquired brands were all market leaders in their small 
segments and each brand has continued their own R&D activities at separate 
production sites. The Chinese R&D units are given high autonomy to cater to their 
specific segments. There is no common corporate knowledge exchange between the 
units since they are not working on the same kind of products, neither are there any 
exchange with other ASSA ABLOY brands or competence centres globally. ASSA 
ABLOY is hence not conducting any knowledge transfer into their new markets. 
There are talks about centralising some of the development; however that would 
mean the R&D units in each segment would be less committed to their closest 
markets but rather transferable to other markets as well. 
 
These examples show that no matter if the R&D is bought or gradually committed, it 
is a natural and logical next step to the Establishment Chain of the Uppsala model. 
 
5.2 Entering the good-enough market or not 
Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring (2007) have discussed whether MNCs should enter the 
good-enough market or not, based upon the company’s competitive position in the 
concerned country and the current state of its industry’s premium market. With a 
premium market that has an eroding position compared to the good-enough market it 
is suggested that the good-enough market should be considered attractive. Gadiesh, 
Leung & Vestring have created a model (see Figure 6, page 25) presenting the 
possible circumstances and their respective suggested actions.  
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The benchmarking companies have progressed differently concerning entering the 
good-enough market. Some have gone further into the good-enough market than 
others. There are also cases of companies that only are discussing the opportunities of 
the good-enough market and other companies that have chosen to neglect it. We have 
distinguished three different phases that the benchmarked companies have reached: 1) 
Ignoring the good-enough market. 2) Discussing how to act. 3) Entered the good-
enough market, which has three subordinate groups: a) Entered from above. b) 
Acquired into the market. c) Both from above and through acquisitions. (See Table 1, 
page 62 for an overview.) 
 
By plotting each studied company in the boxes of Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring’s 
(2007) model  (see Figure 9) we aim to see whether the studied companies are acting 
according to the theory of the good-enough market. We will refer to each of the 
model’s boxes as the “upper left”, “upper right”, “lower left”, and “lower right” box. 
 
 
Figure 9. The benchmarking companies plotted in Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring’s (2007) model "Should you enter the middle market." Source: 
Fang & Wiklund, 2008 
ABB Robotics and Sandvik do not really acknowledge the existence of a good-
enough market in their industries. At least they have chosen to not take any measures 
against it. SKF claims that the low-end market is enhancing the performance and 
quality of its products, but like ABB Robotics and Sandvik, SKF has not chosen to 
act. All three companies have customers seeking productivity generated from the 
purchased products. Productivity is enhanced when they do not have to abort 
processes caused by either failure of the product or because of the product is worn out 
and needs to be replaced. The industry of industrial robots is considered to basically 
only consist of a premium market. Customers buying industrial robots tend to prefer 
automation before manual labour. In China with its inexpensive manual labour, we 
find it being of no doubt that those potential customers that choose robotics are 
seeking productivity and reliability in their production. Consequently, ABB Robotics, 
Sandvik and SKF experience strong premium markets. Since their companies are 
among leaders within each industry, both globally and in China, they are placed in the 
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upper left box of the model. By maintaining their premium positions they are acting 
according to the model. 
 
We interpret the premium segment of packaging consisting of both Tetra Pak’s 
premium and Carton Value range. The Carton Economy range is a form of good-
enough products for a lower market where Carton Value is too expensive. Carton 
Economy is supposed to package the today, unpacked milk around the world’s 
developing markets - a form of good-enough packages for a low price. Tetra Pak is 
plotted in the upper left box because they have a dominant competitive position in 
China and because the premium market for milk packaging is currently growing. One 
of the reasons for the premium market’s growth is the recent increase in the price of 
white milk. The dairy producers in China are trying to compensate the loss of profits 
by promoting enriched milk, a progress recognisable also in the West with increased 
offerings in yoghurts and flavoured milk drinks. According to the model, Tetra Pak is 
suggested to maintain their strong premium status. However, Tetra Pak has previously 
developed and is now producing distribution machines for a lower quality market 
with the Carton Economy range as a step towards creating a larger market.  
 
Alfa Laval perceives the market according to the same segmentation as Gadiesh, 
Leung & Vestring (2007). They have a strong competitive position concerning CHEs 
in China. However, concerning commodity CHEs the good-enough market is 
currently gaining market shares at the expense of the premium market. Alfa Laval 
believes that the specifications of good-enough products will spread both globally, as 
well as being accepted by more and more current premium customers, even in the 
long run. Hence the company is plotted in the upper right box. Alfa Laval has 
principally made the decision of entering the good-enough market. However, they 
have yet to decide how. Alfa Laval is starting a development unit in Shanghai but its 
mission does not yet include designing good-enough products. They are at the same 
time looking for potential acquisition candidates to address but have not yet acquired 
any. Hence both the suggested alternatives for the upper right box are considered.  
 
ASSA ABLOY is a global leader in their industry. ASSA ABLOY has further 
strengthened their position in China through the acquisitions of Guli, Wang Li and 
Baodean. The company perceives the market segmented according to different 
standards. The premium market in China is not very strong since not many of the 
international companies have not managed to penetrate the market with their premium 
products, and local companies are actually dominating the market. This places ASSA 
ABLOY in the upper right box. With its history of Chinese acquisitions; Guli, Wang 
Li and Baodean; ASSA ABLOY has acted accordingly to Gadiesh, Leung & 
Vestring’s recommendations. 
 
Danfoss is experiencing prosperous times in China and is considered to have a strong 
competitive position. Danfoss segments the market according to its standards: the 
international standards market and the good-enough market. The good-enough market 
has grown the last years at the expense of the international standards market, or the so 
called premium market, placing Danfoss also in the upper right box of the model.  
Danfoss is the only company that already has entered the good-enough market both 
Establishing in China’s ‘good-enough’ market 
 61 
from above and by buying their way in; both suggested strategies according to 
Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring (2007). They are targeting the top of the good-enough 
market with their own products and they have acquired the local Chinese company 
Holip to target the true Chinese good-enough market.  
 
Höganäs prefers to segment the market in global, glocal and local according to 
Khanna & Palepu (2006), nevertheless glocal is what we refer to as the good-enough 
market. Höganäs also has a strong competitive position in Asia but the glocal market 
is currently gaining shares at the expense of the premium/global market, making 
Höganäs another member of the upper right box. Höganäs has made the decision of 
entering the glocal market. They have decided to start developing a new range of 
products suited for this market. This is however a short-term strategy since they 
believe that the global market will benefit and increase the most in the long run. 
Which conforms to both the “Should you enter the middle market”-model and the 
containment strategy suggested by Alfa Laval. 
 
In Dynapac’s case, the market is segmented according to Chinese regulations 
concerning rollers and pavers. Dynapac do not have a strong competitive position in 
China because of these regulations since they do not conform to the Dynapac rollers’ 
specifications. As a matter of fact, the regulations do not conform to premium rollers 
at all, hence the plotting of Dynapac in the weak/weak box in the lower right corner 
of the model. Dynapac’s major issue is to achieve large enough volumes in order to 
source material locally and then lower their material costs. According to Gadiesh, 
Leung & Vestring (2007), the suggestion for Dynapac is to acquire their way into the 
Chinese market. Berggren do not discard the possibility of acquiring a Chinese 
company, but they have not acted upon it yet. However, the best possible outcome for 
Dynapac would be changing Chinese regulations.  
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Table 1. The benchmarked companies’ phases regarding entering the good-enough market. Source: 
Fang & Wiklund, 2008.  
 
The previous sections have proven the theory’s validity for our benchmarking 
companies. Since all the benchmarking companies have acted, are acting, or at least 
discussing to act, according to Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring’s (2007) model. 
 
5.3 Merging the good-enough market theory with the Uppsala 
model 
The “Should you enter the middle market”-model gives a good overview of how a 
company’s product offerings and activities are affecting the company’s situation in 
that market. By placing our benchmarked companies into the model, an instant 
snapshot is created based on the same features that characterise one of the change 
aspects in the Uppsala model, the current activities. This “Should you enter the 
middle market”-model simply tells the company, where they are today and what their 
options are. However it would be unwise to decide upon any strategy based on such a 
general model. But if we use the information obtained in the previous section and 
insert it as input into the Uppsala model (see Figure 10) we can analyse the amount of 
resources committed to the Chinese good-enough market at present, how committed 
these resources are, and what kind of market knowledge there exists in the company. 
Together, a commitment decision should be derived. 
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Figure 10. This figure illustrates the “Should you enter the middle market”-
model’s function in the dynamic Uppsala internationalisation model. Source: 
Fang & Wiklund, 2008 
 
5.3.1 State of market commitment 
A company that decides to enter the good-enough market from above has first 
evaluated its current activities and then chosen to further commit itself towards that 
particular market. Entering from above requires nearness to the market itself and 
consequently certain market knowledge. What the company actually knows about the 
good-enough market is generated through its current commitment in that country. 
More commitment mean more knowledge generated through the relationships with its 
existing subsidiaries, sales offices, representative offices, suppliers, distributors, 
retailers, agents, customers; i.e. the industrial network. Based upon what the company 
actually knows about the good-enough market’s stakeholders, the market knowledge 
needs to be converted into developing new products specifically developed for the 
good-enough market. The benchmarking study has showed that the degree of R&D 
commitment increased gradually but most companies are far from having serious 
R&D activities, even on the Chinese premium market, much less activities aimed at 
the good-enough market. The R&D activities of Höganäs and Danfoss (excluding 
Holip) are targeting the high good-enough or low premium market at first, which is 
where every company that have discussed entering the good-enough market from 
above are aiming for. We interpret this as a strong indication of incremental 
commitments to the new segment, and that the further down into the good-enough 
market a company ventures, the more market commitment and knowledge is needed. 
 
These companies’ market commitments to the premium segment are large. Our 
benchmarked companies employ hundreds of people in sales, marketing, 
manufacturing and development in China. These are, according to the Uppsala model, 
considered resources that are tightly committed to the Chinese market specifically. If 
a company strives to enter the good-enough market, additional resources have to be 
committed. The marketing organisation has to gain market knowledge about a new 
type of customers and their needs, creating new R&D units with that market 
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knowledge to design new products and the production has to adapt the operations for 
more products - in other words a huge increase in market commitment. If entering far 
down in the true good-enough market, it most likely requires separate sales 
organisations dealing with different selling agents, hence even more market 
commitment. 
 
But how about the market knowledge, do these companies have enough market 
knowledge to make the decision of huge increase in market commitment? 
 
5.3.2 State of market knowledge 
The market knowledge about the good-enough market varies from case to case. Most 
of the information, concerning the domestic competitors in the good-enough market, 
available to these companies comes from customers or through service engineers 
visiting customers with both premium and good-enough products. Some information 
comes from current sales or marketing activities, mostly when the company failes to 
make any sales to traditional premium customers.  
 
The fact that the companies in the upper right box recognises the existence of a good-
enough segment as well as being concerned about the actors in that market, is a sign 
of extensive market knowledge of the boundaries for the premium segment. However, 
the actual knowledge about the good-enough market is very superficial. Few of the 
companies knew the extent of the good-enough market or the growth rate of the local 
competitors. The required market knowledge of entering the good-enough market is 
like building up entire new industrial network. Only by having reoccurring activities 
that actively attracts participants of good-enough networks can experiential market 
knowledge be obtained. It is by committing sales and marketing resources to target 
the otherwise uninteresting customers who are more price focused that information 
about the competitors in the good enough market can be obtained. The case of 
Höganäs is a good illustration. 
 
Höganäs tries to lift the entire market to a higher standard by sharing their knowledge 
and expertise to suppliers, customers and customers’ customers. Their intention is to 
create a larger premium market but it has also given them a fairly extensive 
knowledge of the good-enough market and its players. Their current activities create 
lots of market commitment since they share their expertise. But it also generates 
extensive market knowledge because they interact with everybody from the iron 
suppliers, to the customers many stages in front of them in the value chain, and most 
importantly also domestic competitors. According to Höganäs it is about choosing the 
battleground on which they are going to meet their glocal competitors. By stealing 
customers and suppliers far down in the good-enough market, the company in the end 
hopes to not having to risk their premium products in direct competition about price.  
 
The same goes for Alfa Laval, they are willing to take the risk of venturing down into 
a market that is culturally totally different from their traditional company mentality 
because they rate the risks of having domestic competition in the premium market 
much higher. The volumes of the good-enough market are to ensure future premium 
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and service profits as the good-enough customers one day will grow into premium 
customers as well. By committing resources on potential customers early, the 
experiential knowledge on those customers will increase for Alfa Laval as well. There 
is a general sense of urgency since many of interviewed companies perceive their 
Chinese competitors to grow and learn very rapidly. By buying rising competitors that 
are in the good-enough market today enables the MNCs to gain the required market 
knowledge and the good-enough mentality in a much shorter period of time than by 
gradually doing it themselves, but most importantly it is a way for MNCs to delay 
direct confrontation with the Chinese for some time.  
 
5.3.3 Commitment decision of change 
We believe that the case of Danfoss clearly illustrates the need of not only purchasing 
a local competitor, but also to commit R&D resources on your own. Most of the 
people we spoke with believe that the demands and requirements of the Chinese 
good-enough market is spreading to less developed markets. Other talked about 
finding Chinese good-enough producers marketing their products in mature markets 
like Western Europe. This indicates that the Chinese good-enough market is gradually 
becoming a global phenomenon that we believe needs to be addressed.  
  
Danfoss proved it to be essential to keep Holip and the rest of Danfoss group quite 
separated since each improvement made by Danfoss on Holip increases Holip’s costs 
structure. If the parent company starts to meddle into the daily operations of the 
acquired company, then the company will gradually cease to be a good-enough 
company and merge into just another production plant within the large MNC. Danfoss 
were also strict with keeping their different R&D units apart. They didn’t want Holip 
to become a low cost R&D resource to be used centrally, but also to hinder Holip 
from learning too many expensive practices.  
 
Having a totally separated company in another market, does not add much new 
market knowledge to the organisation at large. The resources put into the acquired 
company are not very committed to the market in a sense that the parent company can 
quite easily sell the acquired company again. If Danfoss had only acquired the Holip 
and not cared to start an own R&D unit, the strategy of China being the second home 
market, would have sounded a bit hollow. For both Danfoss and Tetra Pak, the R&D 
unit itself has a promotional value.  
 
If a MNC is serious about entering the good-enough segment, the resources invested 
in the market have to be strongly committed. The company must strive to engage in 
activities towards that market and transmit and integrate that gained knowledge to the 
entire organisation. R&D is an excellent resource to commit and most necessary 
current activity to have.  
 
Based on industrial behaviour, the different perspectives we encountered through our 
interviews and the theoretical framework used for this analysis, our recommendation 
for Alfa Laval, our partner company, is to both acquire a local competitor and to set 
up a serious attempt of a development unit in China. The unit should focus on 
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developing products for the upper good-enough or lower high-end markets and to 
make sure that these products can be sold globally. The battle of the global good-
enough market will take place globally. Buying local competitors gives Alfa Laval 
the chance to choose the battle for the Chinese good-enough market on their own 
terms.  
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6 Conclusions 
We have conducted around 40 documented interviews and talked to numerous people 
within Alfa Laval and other institutions. We believe that it is crucial for a MNC to 
experience success in the Chinese good-enough market today in order to ensure future 
success, not only in the Chinese market, but also globally.  
 
The names and definitions of the good-enough market in China varied from company 
to company. But the similarities were clear; a more price sensitive market where 
customers want more product value for money rather than reliability or lifespan. The 
pyramid model of market segmentation in developing countries offered by Khanna & 
Palepu (2006) and Gadiesh, Leung & Vestring (2007) is found to be a well 
descriptive model according to most of the interviewed companies. No matter what 
the companies had chosen to call their markets, it could be represented through the 
pyramid.  
 
The state of the companies’ premium market and the nature of their product offerings 
have a large effect on their view of the good-enough market. Only two out of nine 
companies did not recognise the description of a good-enough market. Most of our 
benchmarking companies believe that in the long run, the premium segment will grow 
the most. The reason is that most Chinese customers strive to become premium 
companies themselves. The companies who saw an emerging or growing good-
enough market also perceived it as a threat of their existing market in China. It is a 
threat partly because of a shift in requirements from traditional premium customers, 
but more importantly, the threat lies in the potential development of companies 
producing good-enough products today. These, mostly domestic Chinese 
manufacturers, improve their quality and technology at an impressive pace. The real 
danger is those good-enough Chinese companies that in a near future are able to enter 
the traditionally high-margin markets.  
 
Among the companies that have acted upon the good-enough market, the trend seems 
to be of adopting a containment strategy against these good-enough companies. The 
MNCs can through acquisitions of key good-enough competitors hope to delay any 
direct confrontation in the premium market for another period of time. They can also 
invest in R&D activities targeting the higher good-enough or lower premium market, 
targeting either new customers or offering lean versions of existing products to 
previous customers. By managing multiple brands, MNCs hope to attract potential 
good-enough customers and with time lift them up to the premium market. The third 
option is to do both of the suggested actions.  
 
The study also confirmed that the pattern of establishing operations in China is 
correlated with the establishment chain from the Uppsala internationalisation model. 
The studied Scandinavian MNCs had all started with sporadic sales into China 
through sales subsidiaries outside of China. Partly because of governmental 
regulations, all except one company, Danfoss, started with forming joint ventures 
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with Chinese factories. We found that the behaviour behind the commitment 
decisions to enter the Chinese market and the behaviour in deciding whether or not to 
enter the Chinese good-enough market, follows the same incremental approach and 
takes into account the same four mechanisms that are described by the Uppsala 
internationalisation model. Two conclusions can be drawn:  
 
• It proves the suitability of the Uppsala model for further establishments into 
new market segments within a foreign market.   
• Establishing R&D activities is a logical step to add to the establishment 
chain. Whether the R&D unit is obtained through acquisition of another 
company or the gradual transfer of core technology knowledge into the 
market, it is the natural further resource commitment needed to develop in 
important foreign markets.  
 
Based on the different perspectives we encountered through our interviews and the 
theoretical framework used for our analysis; our recommendation for further 
establishment into the Chinese good-enough market is:  
 
1. To create global downgraded product versions for products in the risk of 
becoming commodities. The development of such a product can be 
advantageously conducted by Chinese engineers since they are closer to the 
market hence have a better market knowledge. 
2. To acquire a leading good-enough company and to take advantage of their 
superior market knowledge and industrial network in the good-enough 
market. The acquired company should not be integrated with the premium 
parent company. 
 
6.1 Suggestions for further research 
This thesis has opened many doors for more detailed research in many areas. There 
are several factors to take into consideration whether to enter a good-enough market. 
All these factors should be studied in detail. During our research we have, for 
example encountered sales, marketing, logistics, financial, procurement and human 
resource management aspects that definitely require further and more detailed 
attention. 
 
Additionally, the “Should you enter the middle market”-model is fairly simplified. Its 
upper right box is the box where competitive MNCs that should enter the good-
enough market are being plotted. We suggest that the behaviour of these companies 
should be studied closely and examine if it is possible to further develop and divide 
this box into subordinated boxes with new more specific and detailed suggestions. 
 
This thesis has studied the behaviour of premium companies. It would be interesting 
to apply the Uppsala internationalisation model on good-enough companies to see if 
their development towards the premium segment also can be explained according this 
model. 
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Furthermore, we suggest conducting the same analysis on similar companies in other 
BRIC-countries, in this case in Brazil, Russia and India. The expression BRIC-
countries is often mentioned and there is an interest to study if one can observe the 
same behaviour here; if these countries have middle markets similar to China and if 
Scandinavian MNCs are acting according the Uppsala internationalisation model here 
as well.  We believe that our conclusions can be applicable on other emerging 
markets, not just the Chinese market, but this needs to be confirmed. 
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Appendix 
Agenda 
We estimate the interview to take two hours at the most, depending on your answers. 
The interview consists of five main topics as seen below with some standard 
questions. We would like you to take a look through this agenda and see whether 
there are things that you need to look up. If you consider someone else better suited 
for our area of discussion, please feel free to forward us within the organization.  
1. Historical establishment in China 
We would like to know more in detail how the company's establishment in 
China have grown, what have been the key milestones and decisions? How 
have ownerships structures been, joint ventures or acquisitions of Chinese 
companies? Here we try to understand how you have as a company gained 
your expertise in the Chinese market. 
2. Strategic reasons 
What are the company's long-term commitments in China? What is the 
official strategy? What external or internal factors have contributed to the 
strategy? 
3. The Chinese market today and current R&D activities 
Here we like to discuss your views on the present market situation. Have the 
product portfolio been adapted to the Chinese market specifically? Then we 
are interested in how the Chinese organisation relates, reports and 
communicate with the central organisation in Sweden. What forms of 
synergies have arisen, both planned and unplanned?  
4. Pre-studies and lessons learned 
How did the company prepare for the establishment in China. We are curious 
about the what kind of sources/literature/organisations were used to gain 
market information. What are your views on the implementation, what were 
the problems, what could have been done better and what when better than 
expected. 
5. HR-management in China 
What are your views on the existing HR-strategy with regards to recruitment, 
training and retention? What are the pros and cons? Is HRM a priority issue 
or just a necessary evil? How different, in your mind, are HR in China 
compared to Scandinavia? 
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Questionnaire 
Generellt 
1. Berätta lite om dig själv och din bakgrund. 
2. Hur kommer det sig att ni började på företaget? 
3. På vilket sätt jobbar ni mot Kina-marknaden idag? 
 
Historik 
4. Redogör för företagets historiska Kina-etablering.  
5. Berätta mer ingående om de enligt dig kritiska besluten eller mest avgörande 
skeendena. 
6. Varför valdes just den strategin? 
7. Vilka var de viktigaste faktorerna för etableringen, både marknadsmässigt 
och kapacitetsmässigt? 
 
Strategi och avsikter 
8. Hur ser den nuvarande Kina-strategin ut? 
9. Vilken målsättning finns? 
10. Hur pass långsiktig är strategin? 
11. Varför valdes just denna strategi? 
12. Om förvärv eller JV - Varför just dessa företag? Och varför just den 
förvärvsformen? 
13. Om organisk tillväxt - Varför det? Vilka var faktorerna som talade för och 
emot? 
14. Vilka övriga omständigheter, både externt och internt, påverkade besluten? 
15. Överensstämmer kinastrategin med den övergripande strategin för företaget? 
 
Marknadssyn 
16. Hur är marknaden segmenterad? 
17. Hur ser ni på marknaden idag, för fem år sedan och om fem år?  
18. Var någonstans ligger tycker ni att företaget ligger marknadsmässigt? 
19. Vilka trender anar ni på marknaden idag? 
20. Upplever ni att mid-range växer mer än de andra segmenten? 
21. Er relation mot era främsta kinesiska konkurrenter. Head on competition? 
Hur ser ni på dem som hot? 
22. Hur har dessa kinesiska konkurrenter agerat på sistone? 
23. Hur har ni agerat gentemot dem i sin tur? Ex. JV? Uppköp? Etc. 
24. Har företaget tagit fram eller ska ta fram en mer Kina-anpassad 
produktportfölj? 
25. Vad är marknaden beredd att betala för? 
26. Sprider sig kinesiska krav globalt? Ses Kina som en eventuell ny 
världsstandard? 
27. Är eventuella kinesiska produkter ”nedspecade”? Varför exakt? 
28. Hur ser den nuvarande organisationen ut i Kina? 
29. Hur ser R&D organisationen ut i Kina? 
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30. Efter vilka mätetal styrs den med? Hur ofta mäts dem? 
31. Vilka är förväntningarna? Både från lokalt håll och från central ledning. 
32. Hur är den inkorporerad med resten av organisationen och Sverige? 
33. Hur pass marknadsnära är R&D? Är enheten mer av en back-office eller front 
office? 
34. Hur ser det ut i förhållande till eget ansvar v.s. centralstyrt ute i 
organisationen? 
35. Hur har ni satt det beslutsmässiga ramverket för enheten? 
36. Vilka skillnader och likheter i rutiner har ni funnit mellan Sverige och Kina? 
37. Hur ser ni på företagskulturen i Sverige jämfört med den som finns i Kina? 
38. Vilka ideal har ni försökt förmedla gentemot Kina-organisationen?  
39. Vilka synergier har uppstått, både planerade och oplanerade? 
40. Vilka problem har uppstått, både planerade och oplanerade? Dvs både 
produktproblem och organisatoriska problem. 
41. På vilket sätt bidrar den kinesiska R&D-enheten till er värdekedja i Kina och 
även resten av världen? 
 
Lessons Learned och övriga förberedelser 
42. Vände ni er till några specifika journaler/litteraturer och teorier när ni 
planerade etableringen, i så fall vilka? 
43. Tog ni in konsulthjälp inför etableringen, och specifikt med vad? 
44. Nu när etableringen till viss del är klar, hur ser ni på förloppet?  
45. På vilka sätt var den över förväntan och hur har den eventuellt varit en 
besvikelse? 
46. Vill ni dela med er av några praktiska lessons learned? Alltså, vad som ska 
tänkas på, dolda fällor osv. 
 
HR-Management 
47. Beskriv kortfattat hur ert belöningssystem fungerar. 
48. Recruitment 
a. Språkkrav 
b. Arbets/studieerfarenhet 
c. Typ av utlysning/annonsering (headhunters/newspaper ads/ job fairs/ 
etc.) 
d. Golden handshakes? 
e. Västerlänningar eller kineser som intervjuar? 
f. Hur ser ni på arbetskraftskvaliteten som är tillgänglig? 
g. Hur förhåller ni er till att erbjuda raka karriärsvägar? 
49. Training 
a. Vart har fokus legat? 
b. Feedback? 
c. Training centers? I Kina? 
d. Eventuella problem pga kulturella skillnader under träning? Lösning? 
e. Jobbutbyte i väst? 
50. Retention 
a. Det pratas mycket om hög turnover rate på anställda i Kina, har ni 
samma problem?  
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b. Vilket är er genomsnittliga anställningstid för olika yrkesgrupper? 
c. Vad har ni för personalomsättning? (%) 
d. Kan ni identifiera några specifikt utsatta grupper? 
e. Hur skiljer det sig mellan de olika yrkesgrupperna? 
f. Vad har de anställda för förväntningar? 
g. Hur ställer ni er gentemot de förväntningar som den anställde har på 
företaget? 
h. Retention bonus / golden handshakes? Löneutveckling? 
51. Vad erbjuder ni som andra företag inte erbjuder? 
52. Strävar ni efter att erbjuda något mer? 
53. Vad är kvoten för kostnaderna mellan en svensk och en kinesisk ingenjör 
med samma kompetens hur ändras den kvoten med kompetens och tid? 
54. Era största HR-utmaningar? 
55. Övriga skillnader och likheter mellan HR i Kina och era operationer i resten 
av världen? 
56. Finns det faktorer som hjälper/stjälper er rent HR-mässigt för att företaget har 
en svensk/nordisk/dansk företagskultur? 
 
 
